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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
T 1 1 »•• 111 a \ i S 1 1 1 1 1 i ' J i n i i i in I  1111 I  i J r i L! i i i r 1 i n 111 Il t' 11 f > S I- a p p c . 1 1 s 
pursuant to section 63-4 6b- 14, Utah Code Ann 1 19^ ''I , HI id 
section , o -•- ; Utah Code Ann. (Supp, 199JJ. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 . DO t h e c O U I l t y d b b W b i u u h I n v (• r. I iiiliill i 11 1 111 i H l t i j i , I ') I 1 l i l ' i l n l 
these appeals? 
S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w • is I I Im 11JqJ1 I I 11 1 s J 1111 < 111 I a I 1 11111 I 11 I I 
A s s e s s o r s s t a n d i n g was r a i s e d i n proceed ings below I 
3 1 5 , 5 9 8 , 8 4 6 , 1 0 6 1 K 1 -J I'd I, t h e U t a h S t a t e T a x C o m m i s s i o n d i d 
not r u l e on 1 1 1 11 decicl.i iiq t: hi\hw cases This Colli I , I hai t->! un,e(lll 
must c o n s i d e r the i s s u e dg novo. S t a n d i n g Is j u r i s d i c t i o n a l and 
m a y be c o n s i d e r e d for the f i r s t t ime on appea l gee e . g . , 
Harris vs . Spr incrv i l l e Ci tv , / I -"" I" -! I  II l i I I „ I "JO I U l a I h I  y 1 1 h I I on 
r e h e a r i n g ) . 
2. ' . Do exemption standards adopted by the Utah State Tax 
Commission comport with the requirements of Article XIII 
Section 2 of the Uta h Constitution? 
Standard of Review--Under s ections 6 3 - 4 6b-16(4) la ) X 
U t a h C o d e Ann ( I  ,Ll"i ,„'" I Si nil: 1 1 im "'v1'! ! m, I a,, U t a h C o d e Ann il I « 3 
Supp, ), and t h i s C o u r t ' s c a s e s on t h e s u b j e c t , t h e standard * 
rev iew for q u e s t i o n s of I aw 1 including c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
cons t r ii I C t d o n ::i s a 1,l" >r r 0«i" 1 ,i <)II Il • .§ £ g g . gA , 
Ouestar Pipeline Co. vs. Utah State Tax Comm' n, 81 7 P. 2d 316, 
31"; • (Utah 1991). nterpreting - #*- constitutional 
p . -.)-•: : i <:: •11 :: ::  1 :i 1: - esii rum :. 
construction by administrative officers required to apply the 
0, :. 2. I • • 
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provision. l The Tax Commission' s interpretation of the 
constitution' s tax article is especially pertinent in the 
present cases. The Utah Constitution charges the Tax Commission 
with the duty to administer and supervise the state's tax laws, 
including Article XIII Section 2 of the Constitution, and the 
duty to regulate and control the counties in their 
administration of the property taxes. Utah Const. Art. XIII 
§11. The Commission's construction, arising out of its 
practical experience in administering the tax laws, merits 
serious consideration by the Court. 
1
 The general rule is as follows: "In determining the 
meaning of an ambiguous constitutional provision, the courts 
may properly seek extrinsic aid by ascertaining the 
construction given such provision, at the time of its adoption 
and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, 
execute, and apply it in practice. " 16 C. J. S. Constitutional 
L£W § 33 (1984); accord, Parsippanv-Trov Hills Educ. Ass'n vs. 
Board of Educ. , 457 A. 2d 15, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1983) (state commissioners' interpretation of constitutional 
language accorded "certain deference"), cert, denied, 468 A. 2d 
182 (N.J. 1983); Thomas vs. Department of Motor Vehicles. 131 
Cal. Rptr. 164, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (interpretation of 
constitutional provision by state department entitled to 
substantial weight); Three Rivers Jr. College Dist. of Poplar 
Bluff vs. Statler. 421 S. W. 2d 235, 243 (Mo. 1967) (regarding 
constitutionality of tax levy; construction of constitutional 
provision by legislature and the executive "while not binding 
or conclusive, is entitled to weight, if the meaning of the 
constitutional provisions are doubtful, and should not be 
departed from unless manifestly erroneous."); State ex rel. 
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. vs. Sims. 101 S. E. 2d 190, 196 
(W. Va. 1957) ("Even if doubtful, such interpretation [of a 
constitutional provision] by those administering it should be 
given great weight by the courts."); Citv of Roanoke vs. James 
W. Michael' s Bakery Corp. . 21 S. E. 2d 788, 796-97 (Va. 1942) (in 
tax assessment case, interpretation of constitutional provision 
by assembly and state tax commissioner given deference). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
S e c t i oi" ii ; 2 (2 ) a i " L ::l 1 1 :> il: fi i : t ::i c ] < =s XI11 o f 1:he Ut ah 
Constitution, which are set: for th verbatim I n Addendum I lo this 
brief, are determinate ve of the issues on appeal 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
These T - H R O ! idated appeals frt*m decisions f the Utah State 
1 K Itpjv! na I I "onci? i in the 
tax-exempt status of nine hospitals owned by IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
(lierei nafter " IHC" ) The Tax Comma ssi on held i manimous] y that 
the Utah Constitution 1n each case, the county assessor has 
appeal ed the Tax Commissi on' s c:i ecision on the ground tha t: the 
requirements of the Constitution. • 
B. '' Proceedings Below v • • • 
After exempt!on hearirigs at the county 1 evel :ii n, II 99 11 , the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and the Cache County 
ha, ' / , • r hospitals wern tax exempt 
j i ;•. .ea:f . "id "I ' I I ' I < I I "ill ) 
The Utah Coun* \ .^r r-: - < qv.n . : zati .^ n was deadlocked on the 
€ - ' »• a I F » " < I'M'! ' " u it y W:i th 
c u member - . .. .,.(^.*- „- ion abstaining, 
commissioners voted one to one on the exempt status of the 
1 i et a L v ! I Ii I in I Il r Boa i: d • :: f " ;. '.' 
c 
* 
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Equalization wrote IHC advising it that the county' s deadlock 
vote constituted a denial of the exemption. (R. 1653. ) 
The Cache County Assessor and the Salt Lake County Assessor 
appealed the decisions of the Boards of Equalization in those 
counties. (R. 172, 325, 636, 856, 1071 & 1330. ) IHC appealed 
the determination of the secretary of the Utah County Board of 
Equalization that the deadlock vote resulted in a denial of the 
exemption. (R. 1654. )2 All of these appeals were 
consolidated, with others from Weber County, before the Tax 
Commission. In November, 1991, IHC moved for summary judgment 
as to all pending appeals. (R. 140 & 1622.) In support of its 
motion, IHC established that each of its hospitals complied with 
the Tax Commission Standards. On December 17, 1992, the Tax 
Commission granted each of IHC s motions for summary judgment 
holding unanimously that each of the nine hospitals was tax 
exempt for each of the years in question. (R. 43, 240, 468, 
773, 986, 1245 & 1477.) Following the issuance of these 
decisions, the county assessors of Salt Lake, Cache and Utah 
Counties (hereinafter the "County Assessors") filed notice of 
these appeals. The assessor of Weber County did not appeal. 
2
 In IHC s view, Utah County' s tie vote was insufficient 
to "revoke" the hospitals' previously granted exemptions under 
section 59-2-1101(3)(b), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1993). So long 
as appropriate annual affidavits are filed, exemptions continue 
until the county board of equalization decides to end them. 
The Utah County Board of Equalization had granted an exemption 
to the hospitals for all previous years. Sections 59-2-1101, 
59-2-1102, and 59-2-1103, Utah Code Ann. (1992 & Supp. 1993) 
all necessitated an affirmative vote to withdraw the exemption. 
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C. £&£££ 
The Bl-atempnl of f.H I r« a p p e a r i mqi i vi line ARsessoi'F!' Rir i ef 
omits undisputed f a c t s t h a t were c e n t r a l Lo Lhe d e c i s i o n s ot, t h e 
c o u n t y boards of e q u a l i z a t i o n and t h e Ta. x: Commission ;i n t h e s e 
cas es I i ad c:I :i t ii c »r , 1 1 J i s A s s e s s < D r s 1  : >r. I e I: 11J-1 
fac tua l a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t were unsupported i n p r o c e e d i n g s below 
and have no b e a r i n g on t h :l s appeal, Tc s e t r- *^c~ *  s t r a i g h t , 
IHC s e t s fo i tli the , I:c: Ill ] \ ::) , ii ig Eac I::IE • a ] Ill :: f * sputei :i 
in proceedings below. 
1. History of the Hospitals' Exemptions and the Formulation of Tax 
Commission Standards (1990) 
In Utah County vs. J. utei. nioniitai n Heal th Caie, Inc. < '"' 
P 2d 265 (Utah 1985), tins Court nullified statutes that had 
previously govern - - - f — < - r exemptions for non-profit 
hospitals and subsi - ie:i r place., a series uJ 
M
 •; :JL .te-: ::es: adapter :: . ' * Minnesota courts- ' The Utah 
County aecxbxon wtis •• m s , prospect :! ve ««111 'j 1 aki nq 
e f f e c t -> r» January t s I  9 8 6 G e n e r a J Session, the 
Utah Legislature esolved *• -^end Article XIII Section / of the 
Utah Constitution it s ' iiTii "Ii m i l ill hhi"! i e m l e i ijd 
the Court, s Utah County i mooH were submitted to tr" 
3
 T j l e utah County guidelines were borrowed from North 
Star Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 236 N. W. 2d 754, 
757 (Minn. 1975), Although the Minnesota courts still apply 
the North Star guidelines in cases involving charitable 
institutions other than hospitals, see, e. a. . Chicago Health 
geryjggg ygT CpmmisgipnQr pf Reygnyg, 462 N. W. 2d 38' ? = * 
(Minn. 1990) # Minnesota has never applied the g u' lelines 
non-profit hospitals. 
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voters as Proposition One in November of 1986.4 Proposition 
One was narrowly defeated by 50. 1% of the votes cast. 
In the spring of 1987, IHC's hospitals prepared and 
presented to the boards of equalization of thirteen different 
counties applications for property tax exemption. The 
applications were uniform in that they all addressed the issues 
raised by the Utah County decision. After the hearings on those 
applications in 1987, all of the county boards of equalization, 
with the exception of Salt Lake County, granted exemptions to 
IHC s hospitals. In Salt Lake County, the board of equalization 
determined that LDS Hospital, Primary Children' s Medical Center 
and Wasatch Canyons Hospital would be exempt, but that 
Cottonwood Hospital and Alta View Hospital would not be exempt. 
On August 25, 1988, while appeals from some of these 
decisions were pending, the Tax Commission directed county 
boards of equalization to suspend all hospital exemption 
proceedings to allow the Tax Commission the opportunity to 
promulgate uniform standards. In the Tax Commission' s view, the 
guidelines announced in the Utah County case and Yoraasen vs. 
4
 The Legislature' s resolution would have amended Article 
XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constitution to include the words 
"hospital" and "nursing home" in the list of exempt uses of 
property, as follows: 
" (2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is 
used exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital. 
nursing home, or educational purposes . . . ". 
Laws of Utah, 1986 at 802-03. 
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County Bd. of Equalization, 714 P. 2d 65 3 (Utah 1986) cou3 d not : 
i .-* pplied b;;
 :» the counties to individual cases. As the 
Tax Commission sad d: 
These cases have presented a difficult problem for 
both county boards of equalization and the Tax 
Commission. Although they provide general guidance 
and signal the need for increased scrutiny, they do 
not provide counties or the Tax Commission with 
objective standards by which to measure the 
sufficiency of particular exemption applications. As 
a result, for 1986 and subsequent years, different 
counties proceeded to decide hospital and nursing h^ 
applications on the basis of widely divergent 
standards. 
(?. 77 ) The Tax Commission therefore decided to sti idy the IJ'tali 
representatives, and "provide countj offd cials and property 
owners with a definitive set of guidelines i n this a rea " (P 
1989, the Tax Commission conferred with representati ves of the 
counti es , county as ses sors, non- profd t hos pi ta] s and nurs i ng 
homes, and for profi t: ho£ pi t:a ] s ?! series • :i f publ :i c hearings 
followed. After considering the lengthy debates and wrd tten 
submissi ons of the parties, the Tax Commission issued i ts "Non-
pro fd t: Hos pi tal and Nursing Home Charitab] e Property Tax 
Exemption Standards" (hereinafter the "Tax Commission 
Standards" I on December 1 8 1! 990 (1IR 7 0 ) .-.' • . 
2 Hearings Before County Boards of Equalization on the Hospitals' 
Compliance With the Standards (1991) 
--v^ y Commission Standards , 
each ui. xriu/ s •' \ 
02 7 32182 1 
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of equalization new exemption applications for the years 1986 
through 1991-5 The applications followed a common format 
patterned after the Tax Commission Standards themselves. The 
first part related to the hospital' s organization, its 
governance and its history. The second part dealt with issues 
of private inurement, specifically the uses of its revenue, its 
federal tax exemption, payments to officers, employees and 
others, and the nature and business of IHC s affiliates. The 
third part of the application dealt with the hospital' s policies 
and practices relating to the availability of service, 
particularly its admissions and charity policies, and its 
efforts to inform the public about the availability of service. 
The fourth part of each application related to the 
composition of the hospital' s governing board of trustees, IHC s 
board of trustees, and the hospital' s charity plan, which was to 
be submitted annually to the county. The fifth part detailed 
the hospital's "total gift to the community" in accordance with 
the measurement requirements imposed by the Tax Commission. 
Each hospital was required to quantify, in accordance with the 
Standards, the unreimbursed value of indigent care, community 
and professional education and service, medical program 
discounts, donations of time, donations of money, and other 
items that constituted the hospital's gift to the community. 
5
 IHC s applications are included with the record in 
binders, but are not numbered consecutively with the remainder 
of the record. Each of the applications will be referred to by 
hospital name, volume, and page. 
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The sixth and final part described off-site facilities for which 
an exemption was sought. 
In 1991, each county in which IHC owns a hospital held a 
board of equalization hearing on the applications. With the 
exception of Utah County, each county board of equalization 
voted to grant the exemption to each of IHC s hospitals. (R. 
165, 447, 756, 971, 1213 & 1451.) In Utah County, the board of 
equalization, with one member recusing himself, voted one-to-one 
on the exemption issue. (The county commissioner who voted 
against the exemption nevertheless agreed that all three 
hospitals complied with Tax Commission Standards. ) The 
secretary to the Utah County Board of Equalization, in a written 
communication to the hospitals and the county assessor, took the 
position that a one-to-one deadlock constituted a vote to deny 
the exemption. (R. 1653. ) 
3- The Hospitals and the Nature of Their Service to the Community 
The nine hospitals that are the subject of this appeal 
vary greatly in size and scope of service. They range in size 
from American Fork Hospital (a 72-bed acute care medical 
facility serving residents of rural Utah County) to LDS Hospital 
(a 520-bed urban referral center for patients from more than 75 
other health care institutions in six states). The hospitals' 
exemption applications present a detailed picture of each 
hospital's relations with its patients and the community. None 
of the facts set forth in the sworn applications was ever 
disputed in proceedings below. Although the applications 
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describe many differences among the hospitals, the hospitals' 
similarities are more directly relevant to the exemption 
questions raised in these appeals. Following is a brief 
description of the features shared by these hospitals as they 
are relevant to the property tax exemption under Article XIII 
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. 
(a) Ownership and organization 
IHC, which owns and operates the hospitals, is a non-profit 
corporation organized under Utah law, and each of the hospitals 
is organized and operated on a non-profit basis. IHC has no 
stock and no investors. It pays no dividends and distributes no 
profits. IHC s Articles of Incorporation prohibit the payment 
of profits to the trustees, officers or employees of IHC or to 
any other person. Each of the hospitals was organized to 
provide for the care and treatment of the sick, the afflicted, 
the infirm, the aged and the injured. See, e. a. . Logan Reg. 
Hpsp, Appt at 5-7. 
Each of the hospitals is governed by a local board of 
trustees whose members serve without pay and without financial 
interest of any sort in the hospital. IHC and its parent 
company, Intermountain Health Care, Inc. , are likewise governed 
by a board of trustees whose members serve on a completely 
voluntary basis, without pay, and without a financial interest. 
The IHC Board of Trustees is ultimately responsible for the 
hospitals' services, their financial condition, and their long-
term stability as essential public institutions. Id. at 6-7. 
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(b) Revenue, expenses and compensation 
For each relevant year, each hospital' s revenues were used 
entirely for hospital or health care purposes and for no other 
purpose. IiL at 8. Some of the hospitals produced net earnings 
during relevant periods, and some did not. The exact amount of 
each hospital' s annual revenues, expenses and capital 
expenditures was set forth in the applications. 6 During the 
entire period covered by the applications, IHC received a 
federal exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. A copy of IHC s most recent grant of tax exempt 
status from the Internal Revenue Service was annexed to the 
applications. 
The IHC Board of Trustees has the responsibility to set 
compensation for the officers and employees of the system and to 
make sure that payments to vendors and suppliers are reasonable. 
In the applications, IHC described the specific steps taken by 
IHC s Board of Trustees to assure the reasonableness of 
The Assessors have seriously misinterpreted the 
hospitals' financial information to conclude that the 
hospitals' "profits and reserves" increased collectively by 
nearly $100 million between 1986 and 1991 (Assessors' Brief at 
40-41 & 45), with the implication that the hospitals have 
enormous sums of available cash. The "reserve" figures 
selected by the Assessors actually represent each hospital' s 
"fund balance," as reported on its balance sheet. See, e. a. . 
Logan Reg. Hosp. App. Ex. 5. The fund balance is merely the 
difference between assets (including the undepreciated value of 
buildings and other capitalized assets) and liabilities. Thus, 
for example, most of the fund balance for Primary Children' s 
Medical Center for 1990 ($79,420,300) represents the 
undepreciated value of that hospital' s new building and 
equipment, rather than cash. Prim. Child. Med. Ctr. APP. , Vol. 
o / Ex. 2 2. 
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compensation and other payments. See, e. a. . Logan Reg. HOSP. 
APP. at 10-13. For example, with information and advice from 
independent consultants, the Trustees set total compensation 
levels for all executives and administrators that are at or 
below the fiftieth percentile of salaries paid to similarly 
situated executives in other non-profit hospital systems in the 
employment marketplace. Id. at 12 & Ex. 8 thereto. 
On the basis of this record, it was undisputed that IHC s 
payments to officers, employees and vendors did not result in 
"private inurement" within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code.7 (R. 45, 242, 470, 521, 773, 1018, 
1247 & 1480.) 
(c) Admissions policy and Care for the Indigent 
These hospitals serve all patients on the basis of medical 
need, without regard to race, religion, gender or ability to 
pay. The decision to admit or not to admit a patient is based 
entirely upon the clinical judgment of the admitting physician. 
7
 The applications also described each of IHC s corporate 
affiliates, stating the nature of the affiliate's business and 
the uses to which revenues of the affiliates were put. See. 
e. g. . Logan Reg. Hosp. App. at 13-16. With two exceptions, all 
of IHC s affiliated companies are non-profit entities. One 
for-profit subsidiary is IHC Insurance Company, Inc. , which was 
formed in 1987 to enable IHC s hospitals to obtain low cost 
reinsurance coverage. As noted in the applications, IHC saves 
well over $100,000 per year in insurance commissions through 
this company; all of the savings and profits from this entity 
are paid to IHC for the benefit of its non-profit affiliates. 
Id. at 16. The other exception, now called Affiliated 
Services, Inc. , is a company that administers AmeriNet, a 
hospital supply purchasing program that saves IHC s hospitals 
millions of dollars every year. Any profits from this 
affiliate go directly to its non-profit affiliates. Lfix 
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The applications set forth the provisions of the hospitals' 
bylaws and policies regarding admissions. For example, Logan 
Regional Hospital' s bylaws provide: 
All patients shall be served by the hospital 
regardless of race, religion, creed, national 
origin, sex, or ability to pay, with the 
exception of patients who need custodial care 
only. 
Loaan Reg. HQSP. App. at 17 & Ex. 10 thereto. Other hospitals' 
bylaws have similar provisions. IHC s Admissions, Collection 
and Charity Policy, which applies to every hospital in the IHC 
system, provides in part: 
We are committed to providing health care to all 
those who need it, regardless of whether they can 
afford to pay for it. Our commitment to 
charitable services also includes (1) providing 
health care in under-served urban areas and rural 
communities, even to the extent that subsidiza-
tion becomes necessary, (2) community education 
programs and other aids in maintaining public 
health, and (3) education and research in the 
field of medical science for physicians, nurses 
and other allied health professionals. 
Id. at 18 & Ex. 11 thereto. Elsewhere the Policy states: 
In order to relieve the patient of worry over 
bills he cannot pay and in order to relieve our 
collection system of accounts that cannot be 
collected, charity accounts should be identified 
as soon as possible . . . If the patient 
qualifies for a charity writeoff, the patient or 
his guardian should be notified of the decision 
immediately . . . . Most of the patients who 
qualify for charity are distressed and 
embarrassed by their financial condition. The 
hospital personnel who interview such patients 
must treat them with understanding and 
compassion. It is our objective to honor the 
dignity of these people and all others whom we 
serve. 
027X32182.1 
1 * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id, The evidence was undisputed that these provisions 
accurately reflected the practice at each of the hospitals in 
question. 
In each of the applications, the hospitals described their 
efforts to inform patients and public that the hospitals provide 
care to all those in need without regard to ability to pay. 
Since 1988, IHC has distributed an annual report to over 350,000 
households in Utah to describe the nature of its charitable 
services. See, e. a. . Logan Reg. Host). App. Ex. 12. Each year, 
dozens of newspaper articles and other materials advertise the 
availability of free and discounted care. Id. Ex. 12. Hospital 
counsellors have the duty to determine whether patients qualify 
for a reduced charge or free care and, if so, to notify them 
that they will have no obligation to the hospital. See, e.g., 
Logan Reg. Host). Apt), at 19-20. Signs placed throughout the 
hospitals advise patients and the public that the hospitals 
"provide charity care or other assistance to those in medical 
need. " Id. at 20. The hospitals' publications routinely 
contain the statement that the hospitals' "mission is to provide 
quality health care to those with medical needs regardless of 
their ability to pay." I€L 
IHC s urban hospitals (LDS Hospital, Cottonwood Hospital 
and Alta View Hospital) operate indigent care clinics in central 
city and poor neighborhoods to assist indigent people with their 
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primary health care needs.8 These clinics operate on a walk-in 
basis and provide free care to people of all ages. Indigent 
people with serious medical problems are referred directly to an 
IHC hospital for free hospital care. See, e. a. , LPS HOSP. APP. . 
Vol. I, at 25-27. 
Each of the applications set forth the value of the 
hospitals' free care or reduced charge care to the medically 
indigent for each of the years in question. See, e. a. . Logan 
Rea. Hosp. App. at 21-22 & Ex. 14 thereto. At each hospital/ 
the amount of unreimbursed care to indigent patients increased 
significantly during the period 1986 through 1991. The 
applications also detailed the unreimbursed value of hospital 
care for Medicare and Medicaid patients. Id. The increase in 
these shortfalls since 1986 was staggering. For example, in 
1990 alone LDS Hospital provided care under the Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the Utah Medical Assistance Program with 
unreimbursed discounts (based upon the Tax Commission's 
measurement of value) equalling $22.3 million. LDS HOSP. App. . 
Vol I, at 24 & Ex. 15 thereto. This sum represents a 961% 
increase in the unreimbursed amount of these shortfalls since 
1986. Facts set forth in the applications compel the conclusion 
that, with each passing year, these hospitals are shouldering 
the financial burden of medical care for the poor and the 
8
 Since the hospitals' initial applications were filed in 
early 1991, Logan Regional Hospital and Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center have also opened indigent-care clinics in low-
income neighborhoods. 
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elderly, a burden for which government has traditionally been 
responsible. 
(f) Charity plans 
Beginning in 1991, the Tax Commission Standards required 
each hospital to confer annually with the county on whether it 
was meeting the hospital needs of the people. In addition, to 
comply with the Tax Commission Standards, each of the hospitals 
submitted to the county board of equalization a "charity plan." 
The charity plan details ways in which the hospital intends to 
address the needs of the community, including health care and 
educational needs, and the particular needs of indigent 
patients. In each instance, the hospitals invited the county to 
make suggestions as to ways in which the hospital' s charity plan 
could be improved. 
(g) Total gift to the community 
Each hospital, for each year in question, calculated its 
"total gift to the community" in accordance with the Tax 
Commission Standards and then compared its total gift with its 
potential property taxes. Each hospital' s total gift to the 
community was comprised of the reasonable value of unreimbursed 
care to medically indigent patients, the reasonable value of 
volunteer and community service rendered by the hospital, the 
reasonable value of unreimbursed care for patients covered by 
027X32182.1 
4 * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Medicare, Medicaid or similar government entitlement programs, 
the reasonable value of volunteer assistance donated by 
individuals to the hospital, and the value of monetary donations 
given to the hospital during the year. 10 
In each year, and for each hospital, the "total gift to the 
community" far exceeded potential taxes. For example, for 1990 
Logan Regional Hospital' s total gift to the community equalled 
more than $5. 4 million, whereas its potential property tax 
equalled about $370,000. Logan Rea. HOSP. App. at 28 & Ex. 16 
thereto. For 1990, LDS Hospital' s total gift to the community 
exceeded $30.2 million, as compared to a potential property tax 
of $1.8 million. LDS HQSP. APP. , Vol I, at 31 & Ex. 17 thereto. 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center' s total gift to the 
community in 1990 equalled more than $17.6 million, as compared 
to a potential property tax of $653,000. Utah Vallev Rea. Med. 
Ctr. App. . Vol I, at 30 & Ex. 29 thereto. The "total gift to 
The value of indigent care and of medical program 
discounts was calculated in accordance with the Tax 
Commission's Standards. The value was measured by "the 
[hospital's] standard charges, reduced by the average of 
reductions afforded to all patients who are not covered by 
government entitlement programs, plus expenses directly 
associated with special . . . indigent* clinics. " Tax 
Commission Standard V. 
10
 Under Tax Commission Standard V, "where donations are 
spent on depreciable items, the value of the gift should be 
amortized over the useful life of facilities purchased; where 
donations are spent on patient care and non-depreciable items, 
the full amount of the donations should be counted in the year 
of donation; and where donations are retained and invested, 
annual capital appreciation from the donation should be counted 
towards the gift. " 
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the community" does not include bad debt. Rather, it includes 
only those items of community benefit deemed appropriate by the 
Tax Commission. 
(h) Offsite facilities 
Each exemption application described facilities associated 
with the hospital but located away from the hospital campus for 
which exemptions were sought. These offsite facilities included 
indigent care clinics located in central city neighborhoods, 
Instacare facilities, and centralized offices for purchasing, 
management and recruiting. Each of these offsite facilities was 
operated in accordance with the same policies relating to 
charity as the hospitals they serve. Each of these offsite 
facilities was necessitated by either the needs of patients or 
the desirability of achieving economies of centralization. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The county must speak with one voice on exemption issues, 
through its board of equalization, subject to the supervision of 
the Tax Commission. County assessors have no statutory 
responsibilities relating to the determination of exemptions and 
thus lack standing to challenge the county7 s exemption 
decisions, especially where those decisions have been confirmed 
by the Tax Commission. As a result, the Assessors may not 
lawfully pursue these appeals. 
Although this Court' s exemption decisions required closer 
scrutiny of relevant factors, they did not provide county boards 
of equalization with clear and objective standards for 
application to specific cases. As a consequence, in hearings 
held in 1987 and 1988, the counties applied divergent criteria 
in rulings on hospital exemptions. To give the counties 
concrete guidance, and to avoid piecemeal litigation for years, 
the Tax Commission properly undertook the task of fashioning 
objective standards that would be faithful to this Court's 
decisions. 
The Assessors urge the Court to go farther than any state 
supreme court has ever gone in restricting the property tax 
exemption for hospitals. They do so on the basis of two 
assumptions having no support in the law. First, they 
incorrectly assume that "exclusively charitable purposes" under 
Article XIII Section 2 are limited to free hospital care for the 
poor; they assume that, if hospitals accept payment from those 
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who can pay, they are for that reason "commercial" rather than 
"charitable." This is not the law in Utah or any other 
jurisdiction in the United States. Modern authorities agree 
that charity includes the provision of health care on a 
nonprofit basis, to rich and poor alike, so long as the services 
are made available to everyone without regard to financial 
i 
condition. Second, the Assessors incorrectly assume that this 
Court's "material reciprocity" requirement prevents hospitals 
from recovering the costs of indigent care from donations or 
from charges to other patients. If this view prevails, no 
financially viable institution could possibly be "charitable" 
because every charitable institution must obtain—from the 
community, from entitlement programs, or from insurance--the 
resources to fund operations. Nonprofit hospitals, like other 
public charities, are conduits for the community' s resources. 
The Tax Commission Standards represent a painstaking effort 
to hold hospitals accountable and, most importantly, to 
encourage charitable giving. Each hospital must meet each 
standard in order to qualify for the exemption. The standards 
are more rigorous than any exemption standards developed by 
courts for application to hospitals in the United States. Each 
of the Tax Commission Standards finds its source in this Court' s 
decisions. The only one of the Standards that the Assessors 
seriously challenge is Standard V, relating to the hospitals' 
"total gift to the community." After careful consideration of 
all of the Assessors' contentions, the Tax Commission correctly 
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adopted a formula for valuation of the hospitals' gift, 
correctly included donations in the gift, and correctly decided 
to measure the gift against potential property tax liability. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE ASSESSORS LACK STANDING TO BRING THIS APPEAL 
These appeals raise fundamental and, in this state, 
unanswered questions concerning the authority of the county 
assessor to pursue litigation at odds with decisions of county 
commissioners and the Tax Commission. Although this Court has 
entertained tax exemption appeals by county assessors, the Court 
has never been asked to address the question whether a county 
assessor may challenge a property tax exemption where both the 
county board of equalization and the Tax Commission have 
squarely upheld the exemption. Statutes defining the assessors' 
duties and this Court' s decisions on standing make it clear that 
the county assessors may not lawfully pursue this appeal. 
In this state, the corporate powers of county government 
may be exercised only by those with authority under statute. 
Lund vs. Salt Lake County. 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510, 516 (1921). 
A county' s powers may only be exercised by the county 
commissioners or by other officials acting under the 
commissioners' authority or under a specific grant of statutory 
authority. Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-2 (Supp. 1993). Under a 
specific grant of authority, the county commissioners, sitting 
as the board of equalization, may grant or deny property tax 
exemptions on locally assessed property. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
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1102(1) (1992). The board of equalization's authority to 
determine exemptions is subject only to the supervisory 
authority of the Tax Commission, exercised on appeal from the 
exemption decisions of the board of equalization, and to 
judicial review before this Court.11 
In contrast to the county board of equalization, the county 
assessor' s duties are limited to assessing the fair market value 
of non-exempt property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-301, 59-2-303 & 
59-2-303.1 (1992 & Supp. 1993). Nothing in the statutes 
authorizes the assessor to investigate exemptions, to decide 
exemptions, or to challenge the determinations of the board of 
equalization relative to exemptions. To the contrary, the 
statutes make it clear that the county must speak with one voice 
on property tax issues; otherwise the differing views of county 
commissioners and county officers will lead to repetition, 
inefficiency, confusion and needless public expense. To insure 
a degree of order in the county' s administration of the property 
tax, the board of county commissioners has the duty to supervise 
the county assessor. Stillman vs. Lynch. 56 Utah 540, 544-45 
192 P. 272, 274 (1920) (under the predecessor to section 59-2-
1002(2), the board of county commissioners has jurisdiction to 
11
 Section 59-2-1006 provides in part that a "person 
[having] an interest, may appeal [the board of equalization's] 
decision to the commission" under procedures established in 
that statute. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006(1) (1992). This 
authority is a specific example of the general power of the Tax 
Commission to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the 
state" under section 59-1-210(5), Utah Code Ann. (1992), and 
other statutes. 
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d i r e c t t h e a s s e s s o r as t o the method he or she s h a l l employ i n 
t h e a s se s sment of p r o p e r t y ) ; £££ jtlgQ/ PtSfr Cofle AnpT § 5 9 - 2 -
303. 1 (Supp. 1993). 
This Court has established a three-part test for 
determining standing: 
The first general criterion is that the 
"[p]laintiff must be able to show that he has suffered 
some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. " 
Second, if a plaintiff does not have standing 
under the first criterion, he must have standing if no 
one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the 
case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all 
unless that particular plaintiff has standing to raise 
the issue. 
Third, even though standing is not found to exist 
under the first two criteria, plaintiff may 
nonetheless have standing if the issues are unique and 
of such great public importance that they ought to be 
decided in furtherance of the public interest. 
Terracor Inc. vs. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716 P. 2d 796, 799 
(Utah 1986) (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
The Court has applied the same standing test in tax cases, 
requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate a legally protectable 
interest in the controversy before proceeding. In Kennecott 
Corp. vs. Salt Lake County. 702 P. 2d 451 (Utah 1985), the Court 
considered whether a county had standing to challenge assessment 
determinations by the Tax Commission on state-assessed property 
in the county. Citing a "palpable injury that gives [the 
county] a personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation, and 
statutory authority to sue and be sued, the Court upheld the 
county' s standing. Kennecott. 702 P. 2d at 454. The Court noted 
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that " [i]f counties do not have standing to challenge under-
assessments of state-assessed properties, then under-assessments 
could be effectively insulated from challenges, which would not 
likely be made by either a state-assessed property owner, by the 
Tax Commission (which made the under-assessment), or by any 
county-assessed tax payer. " Id. at 455. 
Unlike the county in Kennecott. the assessor has no legally 
protectable interest in the exemption decisions that are the 
subject of these appeals. If the county (as distinguished from 
the county assessor) is dissatisfied with a decision of the Tax 
Commission, the county may challenge the decision before this 
Court. This is, therefore, not a case in which standing should 
be granted to a litigant merely because "there are no more 
likely appellants, and the issue is otherwise unlikely to be 
raised. " Olson vs. Salt Lake City School District. 724 P. 2d 
960, 962-63 n. 1. (Utah 1986). For similar reasons, based upon 
similar statutory schemes, courts of other jurisdictions have 
declined to allow county assessors to appeal from decisions of 
local taxing authorities. 12 Precisely the same result should 
follow in this case. 
See, e. a. , In re Forsyth County. 410 S. E. 2d 533, 533-
34 (N. C. Ct. App. 1991), rev, denied. 413 S. E. 2d 551 (N. C. 
1992); In re Moravian Home. Inc. . 382 S. E. 2d 772, 774-75 (N. C. 
Ct. App. 1989), rev, denied and appeal dismissed. 388 S. E. 2d 
457 (N. C. 1989); Fadell vs. Kovacik. 181 N. E. 2d 228, 230 (Ind. 
1962). 
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POINT II THE TAX COMMISSION HAS THE AUTHORITY AND THE 
OBLIGATION TO ISSUE OBJECTIVE AND CLEAR EXEMPTION 
STANDARDS 
A. The Tax Commission Had Constitutional Authority to Issue the Standards 
Under Article XIII Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Tax Commission is obligated "to administer and 
supervise the tax laws of the State," including the provisions 
of Article XIII, and to regulate and control the counties with 
respect to county-assessed property taxes. Under section 59-1-
210(3), Utah Code Ann. (1992), the Tax Commission has the power 
and the duty to "adopt rules and policies consistent with the 
Constitution and laws of this state, to govern county boards and 
officers in the performance of any duty relating to assessment, 
equalization, and collection of taxes. " It also has the duty, 
under the same statute, "to exercise general supervision over 
assessors and county boards of equalization, and over other 
county officers in the performance of their duties relating to 
the assessment of property and collection of taxes . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(7) (1992). In Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. vs. Garfield County. 811 P. 2d 184, 190 (Utah 1991), 
this Court reviewed the Tax Commission' s authority over the 
counties and concluded: "These statutory provisions are by no 
means exhaustive. They do illustrate, however, that the Tax 
Commission, under Article XIII, has to a large degree assumed 
control of the local administration of the property tax system. " 
For county boards of equalization efficiently to 
determine property tax exemptions each year, the standards for 
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( 
granting or denying exemptions must be clear and objective. If 
the prevailing legal rules for determining exemptions are not 
clear and objective, and have not been consistently applied
 { 
throughout the state, the Tax Commission has the constitutional 
obligation to formulate uniform rules. Pursuant to this 
obligation, the Tax Commission issued the standards that are the 
subject of these appeals. 
B. Objective Standards Were Necessary 
In Utah County, this Court announced a series of , 
factors adapted from the Minnesota courts that could be applied 
as "useful guidelines" to determine a hospital's exemption. 
Utah County, 709 P. 2d at 270. The Court cautioned, however, 
that "each case must be decided on its own facts, and that all 
six factors are not all of eq[ual significance, nor must an 
institution always qualify under all six before it will be 
eligible for an exemption. " Id. The factors announced by the 
Court did not contain objective criteria by which compliance 
could be measured. For example, although the Court stated that 
it would be significant to determine "whether the entity is 
supported, and to what extent, by donations and gifts," id. at 
2 69, the Court did not explain the amount of donations or gifts 
that would be dispositive. Although counties should examine 
"whether the recipients of the [institution]'s 'charity' are 
required to pay for the assistance received, in whole or part, " 
id. . the Court did not explain the extent to which charitable 
exemptions would be limited at facilities that receive payment 
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for services. Utah County, in short, "declined to describe the 
activities and policies of a qualifying institution, finding 
only that . . . [the two defendant hospitals fell] short . . . 
of the constitutional standard. " £fi. at 274 n. 14. Certainly 
Utah County sensitized county boards to the issues and mandated 
more scrutiny, but the case led to confusion because it did not 
provide concrete guidance in specific cases. 
Yoraasen, which came six months later, did not clarify the 
law. In that case, the Court referred to Utah County' s six 
guidelines in passing, but emphasized that "these factors 
operate as guidelines only and should not be read to be 
exclusive or as equally beneficial in each case." Yoraasen. 714 
P. 2d at 657 n. 16. 13 Instead, the Court reverted to a more 
"traditional" analysis to determine whether low-cost housing 
would be exempt: "The test of charitable purpose is a public 
benefit or contribution to the common good or the public 
welfare. It is also necessary that there be an element of gift 
to the community." Id. at 657 (citations omitted). To analyze 
whether a "gift" was conferred, the Court used a "material 
reciprocity" test. The Court said, "If rental * payments are 
insufficient to cover the cost of the complex and are adjusted 
A concurring opinion in Yoraasen cautioned that Utah 
County7 s six factors "may be of limited utility in determining 
whether any specific piece of property . . . is entitled to an 
exemption unless reference is also made to specific facts of 
cases dealing with analogous institutions. " Yoraasen. 714 P. 2d 
at 661 n. 1 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
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to reflect each tenant's ability to pay, then a charitable 
exemption is available; otherwise, it is not. " Id. at 659. 
In the wake of these decisions, the Tax Commission, county 
boards of equalization, and charitable institutions lacked clear 
guidance on the specific standards that should be applied to 
non-profit hospitals. As the Tax Commission stated, "These 
cases have presented a difficult problem for both county boards 
of equalization and the Tax Commission. Although they provide 
general guidance and signal the need for increased scrutiny, 
they do not provide counties or the Tax Commission with 
objective standards by which to measure the sufficiency of 
particular exemption applications." (R. 77. )14 As a result, in 
hearings held for 1986 and 1987, counties proceeded to decide 
hospital and nursing home applications on the basis of divergent 
standards. The Tax Commission correctly perceived its 
obligation to study the Court' s decisions, confer with counties 
and institutional representatives, and derive a set of objective 
standards that could be used efficiently by the Tax Commission 
1
 The Tax Commission made a similar observation in its 
petition for rehearing in the Utah County case in 1985. The 
Tax Commission contended that this Court' s decision did not 
provide specific guidance on exemption issues and 
"misapprehended the enormous administrative burdens and 
practical problems [that the] decision will generate for non-
profit hospitals, other charitable organizations, county 
assessors, county boards and the Tax Commission, all of whom 
are annually involved in the process . . . . " Defendant Tax 
Commission's Petition for Rehearing (Sept. 3, 1985), Utah 
County vs. Intermountain Health Care. Inc. . Case No. 17699 
(Utah Sup. Ct. ). 
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and by the counties. This was the origin of the Standards that 
are the subject of this appeal, 
POINT III THE TAX COMMISSION'S STANDARDS COMPLY WITH 
ARTICLE XIII SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The Tax Commission Standards represent a painstaking effort 
to hold hospitals accountable for their exemptions, to provide 
concrete guidance to counties, to encourage charitable giving, 
and to be faithful to the requirements of the law. In a 
memorandum accompanying the Standards (Addendum IV to this 
brief), the Tax Commission explained the legal sources of each 
of its Standards and the assumptions upon which the Standards 
themselves were based. In these appeals, the Assessors and the 
Tax Commission disagree on many of those assumptions, but their 
two most significant disagreements concern the very nature of 
" charity. " 
First, contrary to the views of the Tax Commission, the 
Assessors believe that "charity" is limited to the provision of 
free care to the poor. They argue that "medical services and 
medical care provided for compensation are presumptively 
commercial. " Assessors7 Brief at 19. Second, contrary to the 
Tax Commission, the Assessors and their amicus curiae believe 
that tax-exempt institutions, in order to remain "charitable," 
may not utilize patient revenue or donations to cover deficits 
resulting from free or discounted care to indigent persons. 
According to the Assessors, if hospitals ultimately recover the 
value of free care to the poor from paying patients or donors, 
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there is "material reciprocity," which should disqualify the 
hospitals from receiving the exemption. 
These disagreements go to the heart of the present appeals. 
Therefore, before dealing with the constitutional authority 
underlying each of the Tax Commission Standards, we first 
address the Assessors' basic assumptions. 
A. Payment from Patients, Government and Insurers Does Not Prohibit the 
Exemption 
In Utah, charity is the "contribution or dedication of 
something of value to the common good. " Utah County. 709 P.2d 
at 269. In Yoraasen. 714 P. 2d at 657, the Court held that "the 
test of charitable purpose is public benefit or contribution to 
the common good. It is also necessary that there be an element 
of gift to the community." Yoraasen made it clear that 
"exclusively charitable purposes" within the meaning of Article 
XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, are not limited to free 
care for indigent persons. This Court said: 
This Court has adopted the general rule that 
the language of the clause exempting 
property "used exclusively . . . for 
charitable purposes" from taxation should be 
strictly construed. This does not mean, 
however, that purposes exclusively 
charitable are limited to the mere relief of 
the destitute or the giving of alms. In 
fact, what qualifies as a purpose 
exclusively charitable is "subject to 
judgment in the light of changing community 
mores. " 
714 P. 2d at 656 (citations omitted) (quoting, Salt Lake County 
yg. T»x Comm'n ?x yelT greater $$uU L^kg Recreational 
Facilities. 596 P. 2d 641, 643 (Utah 1979)). 
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Full service, non-profit hospitals cannot operate 
without revenue from patients, insurers, and government 
entitlement programs. Although donations are critical, they are 
likely to be inadequate to fund the advanced technology, 
facilities and services upon which patients depend for their 
lives. If hospitals did not accept payment from those who can 
pay, they would consume their assets and be forced to close 
their doors. In Utah County, this Court said that its opinion 
was "not intended to imply that an institution must consume its 
assets in order to be eligible for tax exemption — the 
requirement of charitable giving may obviously be met before 
that point is reached. " Utah County. 709 P. 2d at 276. 
No federal or state jurisdiction in the United States 
denies non-profit hospitals or nursing homes a tax exemption on 
the ground that they have received payment from insurance or 
from patients who have the resources to pay. Modern authorities 
agree that the provision of health care on a non-profit basis is 
"charitable" so long as services are made available to both rich 
and poor. The fact that patients who can pay are required to do 
so does not diminish the "charitable" nature of the institution, 
so long as the hospital cares for all those who cannot pay. 
Modern cases have rejected the Assessors' assumption -
that payment automatically disqualifies the charitable 
exemption. £££, ?. gT , Medical Center HOSP. vs. Citv of 
Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352, 1356 (Vt. 1989) ("[I]t is 
unreasonable to suggest that because modern medical institutions 
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no longer operate in precisely the same manner as they did many 
years ago, they should lose their tax-exempt status."); 
Sebastian County Equalization Bd. vs. Western Arkansas Couns. & 
Guid. Ctr. . Inc. , 752 S. W. 2d 755, 757-58 (Ark. 1988) ("[Playing 
patients would not destroy the concept that the money was being 
used exclusively for charitable purposes, as long as the money 
received is devoted altogether to the charitable object which 
the institution is intended to further."); SHARE vs. 
Commissioner of Revenue. 363 N. W. 2d 47, 52 (Minn. 1985) ("The 
term ' charitable' as applied to health care facilities has been 
broadened since earlier times, when it was limited mainly to 
almshouses for the poor."); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 
SoC v vs. County of Gage, 151 N. W. 2d 446, 449 (Neb. 1967). 
(" [T]he courts have defined ' charity' to be something more than 
mere alms-giving or the relief of poverty and distress, and have 
given it a significance broad enough to include practical 
enterprises for the good of humanity operated at a moderate cost 
to those who receive the benefits.") 
Modern cases have also rejected the contention that an 
arbitrary percentage or amount of free care is a prerequisite to 
the exemption. For example, in Medical Center Hospital vs. Citv 
of Burlington. 566 A. 2d 1352 (Vt. 1989), a local taxing 
authority contended that the hospital should lose its exemption 
because it failed to prove that it dispensed an amount of free 
care in excess of the revenues received from paying patients. 
The Vermont Supreme Court acknowledged that tax exemptions are 
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to be strictly construed against the party claiming them, but it 
cautioned that they must be construed "reasonably and not in a 
manner that would defeat the purposes" of the exemption. IcL at 
1354, The court observed that Vermont "has never required a 
certain percentage of free care to be rendered before finding an 
organization to be a tax-exempt charity . . • • " LsL at 1355. 
The court stated: 
In our opinion, pegging charitability to a 
stated amount of free care rendered would 
not be workable in determining an 
organization' s taxable status. Instead, 
uncertainty would reign, with taxability 
determined on a yearly basis depending on 
economic factors not within the control of 
any one person or organization . . . . The 
better inquiry, it seems to us, is the one 
used by the trial court in this case: 
whether health care was made available by 
the plaintiff to all who needed it 
regardless of their ability to pay. 
Id. Other recent cases have reached the same conclusion. 15 
Like Vermont, Utah has never required a percentage of 
free care to be rendered before finding an organization to be a 
tax-exempt charity. The more socially relevant inquiry is 
whether the hospital, like all of the hospitals in these 
appeals, makes technologically advanced health care available to 
all who need it, regardless of their ability to pay, and in 
doing so confers a gift on the community. 
£££/ <?. gT , Rideout HQSP. Found, vs. County of Yuba, 10 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); In re Foundation 
Health Svs. Corp. . 386 S. E. 2d 588, 591 (N. C. Ct. App. 1989), 
review dismissed, 401 S. E. 2d 358 (N. C. 1991); Calloway 
Community Hosp. Ass/ n. vs. Craighead, 759 S. W. 2d 253, 255-56 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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B. The Tax Commission Standards Comply With the Court's "Material 
Reciprocity" Requirement 
Tax Commission Standard V requires each hospital to 
quantify, on an annual basis, the "gift" it confers on the 
community in terms of free care to indigent patients, the value 
of discounts to Medicare, Medicaid, and Utah Medical Assistance 
Program patients, the unreimbursed value of health science 
research, physician education, and public health education, and 
the value of donations that enhance the hospital' s mission. 
Pursuant to this Standard, the hospitals attempted to show that 
they contribute "something of value to the common good," that 
there exists "a substantial imbalance in the exchange between 
the charity and the recipient of its services," that there is a 
lack of "material reciprocity" between the hospital and 
recipients of hospital services. Utah County. 709 P. 2d at 269. 
The Assessors and their amicus curiae, however, claim 
that none of the hospitals' gifts is a "gift" at all. They 
claim that because hospitals recover the costs of indigent care, 
research and education from paying patients, insurance and 
government payments, and donors, there is no "imbalance in the 
exchange." The Assessors argue: "Uncompensated care and 
community services are merely components of a rate structure 
passed on to others with health insurance or the means to pay 
hospital bills. In that sense, it is arguable that no gift to 
the community occurs through the operation of an IHC hospital 
. . . ." Assessors' Brief at 47. 
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If the Assessors' viewpoint prevails, no financially 
viable hospital could possibly be "charitable" because every 
hospital must obtain from somewhere the resources to provide the 
most advanced service to the community, now and in the future. 
Hospitals cannot print money. Rather, like all other charitable 
institutions, they act as a conduit for the community' s 
resources, to take care of the health care needs of the 
community today and tomorrow. They must cover the cost of 
indigent care with money from donors, government, insurance, and 
paying patients; otherwise they would quickly go out of service. 
The "material reciprocity" requirement does not compel charities 
to operate at a deficit. 16 In his concurring opinion in 
Yoraasen, Justice Zimmerman made precisely the same point: 
[The material reciprocity requirement] does 
not weigh all monies received from all 
sources, on the one hand, and the cost of 
services provided, on the other, and 
determine that a gift occurs only when the 
result is a net material flow of wealth to 
the recipient. Such a test would be useless 
16
 This Court borrowed the phrase "material reciprocity" 
from United Presbyterian Ass' n vs. Board of County 
Commissioners, 448 P. 2d 967, 976 (Colo. 1968), in which the 
court said: "[W]here material reciprocity between alleged 
recipients and their alleged donor exists -- then charity does 
not. " See Friendship Manor Corp. vs. Tax Comm' n. 26 Utah 2d 
227, 487 P. 2d 1272, 1279 (1971). In Viutefl Presbyterian Agg'n, 
the Colorado court was primarily concerned with the alleged 
charity' s refusal to provide financial assistance to persons 
who could not pay for its services. 448 P. 2d at 970. The 
Colorado cases construing United Presbyterian Ass' n have 
repeatedly upheld the charitable exemption where the charity 
charges a fee for services to those who are able to pay. E. a. , 
Brandt vs. West Foundation. 652 P. 2d 564, 568 (Colo. 1982); 
American Water Works Ass'n vs. Board of Assessment Appeals, 563 
P. 2d 359, 362-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). 
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because it could not be satisfied by any 
viable charitable entity. Only those 
entities that could demonstrate a fatal 
hemorrhaging of assets and their candidacy 
for sure bankruptcy could show a lack of 
material reciprocity. By looking rather at { 
the transactions between the provider of . . 
. services and the recipient, the test seeks 
to identify those making a gift to 
individuals. 
Yoraasen. 714 P. 2d at 662-63. < 
Tax Commission Standard V looks at "the transactions 
between the provider of . . . services and the recipient." Each 
hospital's "total gift to the community" provides an accounting < 
of its gifts to individuals (in the form of free or discounted 
patient care) and to the community as a whole (in the form of 
unreimbursed expenses for physician education, public health I 
research, and public health education). The hospitals' 
significant contributions to the public good should not be 
ignored merely because hospitals must use the resources at their < 
disposal to serve the community 
C. Each of the Standards Complies With Article XIII Section 2 
The Assessors challenge five of the Tax Commission' s i 
six standards on the ground that they do not comply with this 
Court' s decision interpreting Article XIII Section 2. Although 
Utah County and Yoraasen do not directly address some of the 
issues raised by the Assessors, it is clear nevertheless that 
the Assessors' challenges are based entirely upon assumptions 
that have no support in the law. The Tax Commission Standards 
represent a thoughtful effort, after months of hearings, to 
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establish clear and objective standards faithful to the 
requirements of this Court' s decisions. 
1. The "Organizational" Standard 
Standard I generally requires that the 
institution be organized on a non-profit basis for appropriate 
purposes, and that its property be dedicated to its charitable 
purpose. This Standard derives directly from Article XIII 
Section 2, which requires the owner of the exempt property to be 
a "non-profit entity." In Utah County, this Court held that a 
hospital seeking an exemption must show that its "stated 
purpose" is to provide a significant service to others "without 
immediate expectation of material reward. " 709 P. 2d at 269. 
Specifically, the Court examined the institution' s corporate 
purposes and the restrictions on the distribution of assets to 
private interests as set forth in its Articles of Incorporation. 
Id. at 272-73. Tax Commission Standard I requires exactly the 
same inquiry. 
The Assessors do not suggest that the Tax 
Commission' s Standard is incorrect, but that, standing alone, it 
is not enough to qualify an institution for an exemption. We 
agree. Tax Commission Standard I was designed to deal with 
organizational issues. Other Standards deal with questions of 
charitable operation, availability of services, and the amount 
of the institution's "gift to the community." As a Standard 
relating to the organizational requirements of the law, Tax 
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Commission Standard I accurately reflects the requirements 
imposed by the Utah Constitution and this Court. 17 
2. The "Private Inurement" Standard 
Standard II requires the institution to show that 
net earnings and donations do not inure to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual, as interpreted under federal 
tax law. The standard provides that proof of a hospital7 s 
compliance with section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
creates a rebuttable presumption that its operations do not 
result in "private inurement." In addition to proving 
compliance with section 501(c)(3), hospitals must provide the 
counties with annual statements of expenditures and revenues, 
balance sheets, and detailed descriptions of the manner in which 
compensation is set and payments to vendors are monitored. 
The Assessors' complaints concerning this 
Standard fall generally into two categories. First, they 
complain that compliance with section 501(c)(3) "has never been 
sufficient to establish a basis for property tax exemption. " 
17
 The Assessors and their amicus suggest repeatedly that 
there is no significant difference between the operations of 
these non-profit hospitals and the operations of for-profit 
hospitals in Utah. Although this Court' s cases and the Tax 
Commission Standards do not require non-profit hospitals to 
compare themselves with for-profit hospitals, it is obvious 
that for-profit hospitals could not qualify for the exemption. 
Most obviously, for-profit hospitals could not possibly meet 
Standard I or Standard II because, by definition, they are 
organized and operated to distribute surplus revenue to 
investors as profit; they are not required, as are these non-
profit hospitals, to use any and all surplus revenue for the 
enhancement of the institution' s health care mission. Non-
profit hospitals have an exclusively public purpose. 
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Appellants7 brief at 20. Second, the Assessors complain that 
the informational requirements of the Standard are too "loose," 
although the Assessors do not now suggest — and they have never 
suggested — any other "private inurement" standard that should 
be applied in place of section 501(c)(3), 
The source of Tax Commission Standard II is again 
the Utah County case, which held that counties must consider 
"whether private interests are benefitted by the organization or 
operation" of hospitals that apply for the exemption, 709 P. 2d 
at 276, and "whether income received from all sources produces a 
' profit' to the entity . . . ." 1^ at 269. Compliance with 
this Standard alone is insufficient to obtain the exemption. 
Again, Standard II is one of six Standards, and compliance with 
all six Standards is necessary for any institution to obtain the 
exemption. For the limited purpose of determining whether an 
institution's payments constitute "private inurement" in 
specific fact situations, the Tax Commission incorporated the 
federal rules relating to private inurement under section 
501(c)(3) because they constitute a "ready made and well-
established body of law" for that purpose. 
Section 501(c)(3) allows the charitable exemption 
if "no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual . . . . " The United 
States Treasury Department has construed this provision 
authoritatively in regulations, 26 C. F. R. 1. 501 (c) (3)-1, et seg. 
(1992), and in many revenue rulings that directly concern 
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hospitals, in relation to fact situations that recur in these 
and other institutions. See, e. a. . Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1969-
2 C. B. 117. The federal courts, in turn, have interpreted and 
applied these rules in many hospital cases, with the result that 
there now exists a body of law on private inurement in the 
health care context. See cases cited in Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 
(CCH) U 22,609.30 (1992) and idt 1ffl 42,598-99. The Tax 
Commission had no reason to invent a new body of law on the 
private inurement issue, especially where the federal standard 
has been so widely and exhaustively applied in the hospital 
context. 
3. The "Admissions and Treatment" Standard 
Standard III, which the Assessors do not even 
discuss, requires each hospital to establish three things. 
First, the hospital must show that it admits patients without 
regard to race, religion or gender. Second, the hospital must 
show that the decision to treat or admit a patient is based upon 
the clinical judgment of the admitting physician, and not upon 
the patient' s financial condition. Third, the hospital must 
show that indigent people who require hospital services receive 
them for a reduced charge or for no charge in accordance with 
their ability to pay. In addition, under this Standard the 
hospital must provide evidence of its efforts to inform the 
public of its open-access policy and of the availability of 
services for the indigent. 
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This Standard derives from three of Utah County' s 
guidelines, specifically those concerning (1) "whether the 
recipients of the ' charity' are required to pay for the 
assistance received, in whole or part"; (2) "whether the 
beneficiaries of the 'charity' are restricted and, if 
restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable 
relationship to the entity's charitable objective"; and (3) 
"whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a 
significant service to others without regard to immediate 
expectation of material reward. " 709 P. 2d at 269. 
4. The "Public Interest" Standard 
Standard IV requires hospitals to show that their 
policies reflect the public interest. They must do so by 
demonstrating that their governing boards have broad based 
membership and function in a generally open atmosphere, and that 
they seek to address the health care needs of the community. 
The Standard sets forth several ways in which these goals must 
be accomplished, including annual conferences between the 
hospital and the county concerning the community' s clinical 
hospital needs and annual submission of a hospital ' charity 
plan' to the county. The Standard derives from the legal 
principle, announced in a number of this Court' s cases, that the 
"act of giving", which is essential to charity, may be 
identified "in the lessening of a government burden through the 
charity's operation." Utah County. 709 P. 2d 269; Salt Lake 
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County vs. Tax Common ex rel. Laborers7 Local No. 295. 658 P. 2d 
1192, 1198 (Utah 1983)(Oaks, J., concurring). 
Although the precise nature of their challenge to 
this Standard is not clear (see Assessors7 Brief at 21-22), the 
Assessors apparently believe that this Standard should prohibit 
a hospital system from utilizing revenues derived from hospital 
operations in one county to assist hospitals in another county. 
Nothing in Article XIII Section 2, however, compels such a 
limitation on the operation of a hospital system. If IHC were 
not allowed to direct capital to hospitals on an as-needed 
basis, the needs of many hospitals could simply not be met. The 
hospitals in the system would, in effect, be deprived of the 
benefits of the system itself. 18 Hardest hit would be IHC s 
hospitals in rural Utah, which operate at a deficit every year. 
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decisions of this Court 
requires a statewide hospital system (or any other statewide or 
18
 IHC s hospitals operate as a system to save patients 
money and to improve the quality of care. Dr. Kenneth Thorpe, 
one of President Clinton' s health care advisors, has commented 
that IHC s system-wide approach to health care quality places 
it "at the forefront" of health care reform. J. Melby, 
"Clinton Advisor Points to Western Hospital Chain As Model for 
Quality During Cost Reduction," Quality Matters (January 1993). 
IHC clinical research conducted on hospital procedures and 
applied system-wide have been proven to save lives and millions 
of dollars in cost. See D. C. Classen, "The Timing of 
Prophylactic Administration of Antibiotics and the Risk of 
Surgical Wound Infections," New England Journal of Medicine. 
Jan. 30, 1991, at 281; D. C. Classen, "Computerized Surveillance 
of Adverse Drug Events in Hospital Patients," Journal of the 
American Medical Ass' n. Nov. 27, 1991, at 2847. 
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national charity) to waste money by operating its hospitals (or 
local chapters) as isolated entities. 
5. The "Total Gift to the Community" Standard 
The Assessors' principal objection is to Tax 
Commission Standard V, which requires the quantification of an 
institution's "total gift to the community." The hospital must 
enumerate and total the various ways in which it provides 
unreimbursed service to the community according to measurement 
criteria set forth in the Standard. For example, the value of 
unreimbursed care to indigent patients must be measured by the 
hospital's normal billing rates, reduced by the average of 
reductions afforded to all patients who are not covered by 
government entitlement programs, plus expenses directly 
associated with special indigent clinics.19 Under the 
Standard, quantifiable portions of the gift are totaled, and the 
total must exceed, on an annual basis, the hospital's property 
tax liability for the year. 
This Standard, like Standard IV, derives from the 
need to prove a "gift" by showing "a substantial imbalance in 
the exchange between the charity and the recipient of the 
services" or by showing "the lessening of a government burden." 
Utah County. 709 P. 2d at 269. In Yoraasen. 714 P. 2d at 660 & 
n. 29, this Court utilized a gift-to-tax comparison similar to 
19
 The discounts averaged under this Standard are 
primarily "contractual allowances" negotiated with insurance 
carriers and employee groups. The average of discounts does 
not include those provided to indigents. 
027\32182.1 
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the one used in Standard V. The individual elements of the 
gift, as set forth in Standard V, also reflect factors deemed 
important by the Court' s Utah County opinion, including 
unreimbursed care to indigents, elderly and other patients, and 
the quantification of donations to the institution. Standard V 
assists the counties in providing an objective and appropriate 
yardstick against which to measure each hospital' s gift to the 
community. 
The objections to this Standard fall into four 
general categories. We address them in turn. 
First, the Assessors argue that the value of 
hospital service should be measured by "cost" rather than the 
Tax Commission' s value formula (i.e., normal billing rates 
discounted by the average of discounts afforded to patients 
other than those covered by government entitlement programs). 
This issue was the subject of exhaustive debate before, and 
careful study by, the Tax Commission during hearings in 1988 and 
1989. As the Assessors know from that debate, the task of 
establishing the "cost" of a particular patient's hospital stay 
is difficult and expensive. The effort required to establish 
the "cost" of each service provided to each of hundreds of 
thousands of patients every year would outstrip the accounting 
resources of the hospitals; the allocation of costs from all of 
an institution' s departments to individual patients would 
probably raise more accounting questions than it would answer. 
It is doubtful, moreover, that such an exercise would come any 
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closer to the value of hospital service than the Tax 
Commission7 s formula, which is much simpler to administer. 
Second, the Assessors argue that donations of 
time and money to the hospitals should not count as part of the 
hospitals' gift because such donations are not made &£ a 
hospital, but are made ££ a hospital. Ultimately, however, all 
of a charity' s gifts to the community come from the community. 
A charitable institution is nothing more than the conduit for 
the community' s charity; it is organized to marshall and 
administer the community' s resources to provide essential 
services for everyone regardless of wealth. Standard V requires 
each hospital to compute donations of time and money in terms 
that explain exactly how much patients saved, during the year, 
as a consequence of donations.20 
zo
 In related arguments, the Assessors claim that the 
hospitals either do not receive enough donations or do not 
actually rely on donations they receive. As the Assessors 
contend: " [T]he operating surpluses and increases in hospital 
reserves show that . . . donations did not reduce patient costs 
or reliance on patient charges. " Assessors' Brief at 37. To 
this argument we have three brief responses. 
First, the IHC Board of Trustees carefully budgets the 
amount of reserves on an annual basis in accordance with a 
written policy. (The written policy is attached as Ex. 2 to 
Alan L. Sullivan' s letter to John G. Avery, dated September 27, 
1991, included in a file entitled "Responses to Information 
Requests" in the record.) IHC reserve balances (for working 
capital, building and equipment replacement, self-insurance, 
and operating risks) are necessary to ensure that the hospitals 
will be able to continue in operation. We respectfully suggest 
that, on this issue, it is not for the Assessors to second-
guess the financial judgment of those having the fiduciary duty 
to maintain IHC s system of hospitals. 
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Third, the Assessors argue that discounts 
afforded to Medicare patients (the difference between value of 
service and Medicare reimbursement) should not count towards the 
hospitals' gift because Medicare is not "means-tested" and the 
hospitals' participation in the Medicare program is "voluntary." 
Care for the elderly, however, is central to IHC s mission. It 
i 
cannot seriously be doubted that in caring for sick or injured 
elderly people, and in accepting Medicare reimbursement as full 
payment, the hospitals provide an important gift to the 
community. At Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, for example, 
this portion of the gift totaled $11,120,953 in 1990. Utah 
Valley Reg. Med. Ctr. App. , Vol. 3, Ex. 29. 
Finally, amicus curiae argues that Standard V is 
defective because it does not require hospitals to show that 
their patient charges are "below market" as the result of 
i 
donations or their non-profit status. See Amicus Brief at 3 3. 
In the context of these appeals, this contention is extremely 
unfair. The hospitals did not present charge comparisons to the 
counties because the Tax Commission Standards did not require 
Second, it is absurd for the Assessors to suggest that 
donations do not reduce patient costs. The applications 
describe in detail the exact amounts of donations devoted to 
identified projects at each hospital or for patient care. If 
donations were not received, the funds for these efforts would 
necessarily have come from patient charges. 
Third. the only case that the Assessors cite to prove the 
alleged insufficiency of donations is SEMECO v. Tax Commission. 
209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (Utah 1993), a religious exemption case 
in which this Court did not even consider the charitable 
exemption. 
n?7\T?iR? 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such information. In addition, as the Assessors know, until 
recently charge comparison information was impossible to obtain 
in a statistically meaningful and verifiable form. (R. 144-45. ) 
In late 1991, for the first time, data from the Health Care 
Financing Administration, the federal agency that administers 
Medicare, enabled IHC and other health care providers to compare 
their charges with those of other hospitals on a local, state 
and national basis. (R. 146. ) When these data became 
available, IHC presented them to the Tax Commission to show that 
charges at IHC s hospitals were significantly lower than at 
other hospitals, in Utah and elsewhere, for comparable services. 
(R. 140. ) The Assessors objected to the admission of charge 
comparisons and moved to strike them on the ground, among 
others, that they were irrelevant. (R. 122. ) Thereafter, all 
parties stipulated that the charge comparisons did not bear upon 
the issues before the Tax Commission, and they were withdrawn. 
(R. 86. ) 
6. The "Off-Site Facilities" Standard 
Standard VI provides that satellite health care 
facilities and centralized support facilities are entitled to 
property tax exemption if it is shown that these facilities 
enhance and improve the governing hospital' s mission. This 
Standard relates primarily to IHC s indigent care clinics and 
"Instacare" facilities, each of which is operated as a part of 
the hospital with which it is associated, and IHC s central 
offices, which provide management, planning, accounting, and 
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related support to each of the hospitals. The Assessors object 
to this Standard on the ground that satellite facilities should 
independently demonstrate that they, "in their own separate 
operation, qualify for property tax exemption. " Assessors' 
Brief at 29. 
In the applications relating to each of the 
hospitals, we showed that each of the satellite facilities was 
necessary to fulfillment of the hospital' s mission. We 
described the reasons for the location of each facility and the 
governance of each facility by the hospital' s board of trustees 
and administration. For example, IHC s Instacare facilities are 
located in neighborhoods for patient convenience and to reduce 
the costs of emergency care. E. g. . LPS HQSTD. App. , Vol. I, at 
53-54. Each satellite facility is governed by the same policies 
relating to care for indigents and admissions as the hospitals 
with which it is associated. Id. The relevant financial 
information relating to each satellite facility was reported to 
the relevant board of equalization as part of the hospital' s 
application for property tax exemption. 
Although this Court has not specifically passed 
on the availability of a property tax exemption for satellite 
facilities of charitable institutions, other courts have 
uniformly held that, so long as the satellite facility is 
"reasonably necessary" to the hospital's purpose, and is 
governed by the same policies relating to admissions, it shares 
the exempt status of the hospital. In St. Elizabeth Hospital. 
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Inc. vs. Citv of Armleton, 416 N. W. 2d 620 (Wis, Ct. App. 1987), 
the Wisconsin court considered whether a primary care clinic 
operated by an exempt hospital would share in the exemption of 
the hospital. The hospital showed that the clinic was governed 
by the same charity-care policies as governed the hospital and 
that the clinic advanced the charitable purposes of the 
hospital's trustees. The court upheld the exemption with 
respect to the clinic as follows: 
We conclude that under the facts of this 
case, the operation of the . . . unit at 
issue is a reasonably necessary function of 
St. Elizabeth Hospital. The [clinic's] 
service is a direct function of the 
hospital's broad purpose of diagnosing and 
treating the sick or injured. By means of 
the "triage" classification, patients who 
need urgent care are treated immediately. 
Additionally, persons presenting less minor 
injuries are also seen by a physician more 
quickly and at less expense. In this manner 
care is delivered to all patients more 
efficiently, avoiding the traditional delays 
in emergency room services. 
416 N. W. 2d at 622. The court concluded that "providing episodic 
services to these patients in a clinic-type environment also 
furthers the hospital' s fundamental purpose. " Id. More 
generally, the courts have held that parking lots, laundry 
space, and office space reasonably necessary for the functioning 
of the hospital are exempt, if the hospital is exempt. 21 These 
See, e. a. , Medical Center HOSP. vs. City of 
Burlington. 566 A. 2d 1352 (upholding tax-exempt status of real 
property devoted to parking for employees and patients, offices 
for anesthesiologists and radiologists, hospital data 
processing, and laboratories); Northwestern Memorial Found, vs. 
Johnson. 490 N. E. 2d 161, 164 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (parking lot 
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authorities provide ample support for the Tax Commission' s 
conclusion that satellite facilities and central offices that 
support and advance the purposes of the hospital should share 
the hospital' s exemption. 
CONCLUSION 
If the system is to work fairly and efficiently, hospitals 
and counties need clear rules that can be applied with certainty 
to concrete facts. The Tax Commission has carefully fashioned 
exemption standards capable of practical application by busy 
county boards of equalization. The standards are the most 
rigorous of any court-fashioned exemption rules in the nation. 
They are faithful to the requirements of the Constitution. This 
Court should sustain the Tax Commission Standards, and the 
decisions of the Tax Commission should be affirmed in every 
particular. 
DATED this day of September, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Ronald G. Moffitt 
BvIVlSvi—. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
run in connection with the hospital found to be tax exempt); 
Hotel Dieu vs. Williams, 410 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (La. 1982) 
(office building and parking garage, used for purposes of the 
hospital, found to be exempt); Methodist Hosps. vs. Assessment 
Appeals Comm/ n, 669 S. W. 2d 305, 307 (Tenn. 1984) (non-profit 
hospital' s parking lot was exempt as an essential and integral 
part of the hospital). 
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ADDENDUM I 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII Section 2(2): 
11
 (2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is 
used exclusively for religious, charitable or 
educational purposes . . . " 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII Section 11: 
"There shall be a State Tax Commission 
consisting of four members, not more than 
two of whom shall belong to the same 
political party. The members of the 
Commission shall be appointed by the 
Governor, by and with the consent of the 
Senate, for such terms of office as may be 
provided by law. The State Tax Commission 
shall administer and supervise the tax laws 
of the State. It shall assess mines and 
public utilities and adjust and equalize the 
valuation and assessment of property among 
the several counties. It shall have such 
other powers of original assessment as the 
Legislature may provide. Under such 
regulations in such cases and within such 
limitations as the Legislature may 
prescribe, it shall review proposed bond 
issues, revise the tax levies of local 
governmental units, and equalize the 
assessment and valuation of property within 
the counties. The duties imposed upon the 
State Board of Equalization by the 
Constitution and Laws of this State shall be 
performed by the State Tax Commission. 
"In each county of this State there 
shall be a County Board of Equalization 
consisting of the Board of County 
Commissioners of said county. The County 
Boards of Equalization shall adjust and 
equalize the valuation and assessment of the 
real and personal property within their 
respective counties, subject to such 
regulation and control by the State Tax 
Commission as may be prescribed by law. The 
State Tax Commission and the County Boards 
of Equalization shall each have such other 
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( 
powers as may be prescribed by the 
Legislature. " 
{ 
i 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
CACHE COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER 
v. ) 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ) Appeal No. 92-0332 
OF CACHE COUNTY, : 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Tax Type: Property 
ex rel.: IHC HOSPITALS, INC., : 
) Re: Logan Regional Hospital 
Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a hearing on IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 28, 1992. Commissioners, R. H. Hansen, Roger 0. Tew, Joe B. 
Pacheco, and S. Blaine Willes, heard the matter for and on behalf 
of the Commission. Present and representing IHC Hospitals were 
Alan L. Sullivan, Esq. and Ronald G. Moffitt, Esq. Present and 
representing the Petitioner was Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Based upon the arguments of counsel for the respective 
parties and the memoranda submitted in support of those arguments, 
the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The years in question are 1989, 1990 and 1991. 
3. On September 10, 1991 the Board of Equalization of 
Cache County, Utah considered the application for property tax 
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Appeal No. 92-0332 
exemption submitted by IHC Hospitals, Inc., for the Logan Regional 
Hospital for the tax years 1989, 1990 and 1991. 
4. After full consideration of the evidence presented, 
the Board of Equalization of Cache County issued its Findings and 
Determination on January 14, 1992. 
5. In its findings and determination, the Board of 
Equalization of Cache County applied the Nonprofit Hospital and 
Nursing Home Charitable Property Tax Exemption Standards 
established by the Utah State Tax Commission. The determination of 
the Board of Equalization was that pursuant to the Tax Commission's 
standards the IHC Hospitals, Inc. and the Logan Regional Hospital 
property qualified for exemption from the property tax. 
6. The standards were issued by the Utah State Tax 
Commission on December 18, 1990, and a copy of those standards are 
attached to this order. (Exhibit "A"). 
7. The standards were developed by the Utah State Tax 
Commission after an extensive analysis of applicable state law, 
court decisions, and input from local government officials, 
institutional representatives and the public. 
8. The Utah State Tax Commission developed and issued 
the standards to provide an objective and relatively simple 
framework for determining property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
hospitals and nursing homes. The primary objective in the 
development of the standards was the establishment of uniform 
statewide standards of review and analysis which are both legally 
-2-
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supportable and administratively feasible. A document entitled 
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Property Tax 
Exemption Standards for Nonprofit Hospitals and Nursing Homes" 
which was issued by the Utah State Tax Commission together with the 
standards is attached to and incorporated as part of this order. 
The document outlines in detail the legal rationale and 
administrative need for the standards. (Exhibit "B"). 
9. The Petitioner filed its appeal to the Utah State Tax 
Commission from the determination of the Cache County Board of 
Equalization on February 12, 1992. 
10. On April 28, 1992, a hearing was held on IHC 
Hospitals' Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing all 
parties agreed that IHC Hospitals, Inc., Logan Regional Hospital 
met the non-profit hospital and nursing home charitable property 
tax exemption standards promulgated by the Tax Commission. The 
Petitioner argued however, that such standards did not satisfy the 
requirements of Section 2, Article XIII, of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the present case there exists no genuine issue as 
to any material fact regarding IHC Hospitals having met the non-
profit hospital, nursing home charitable property tax exemption 
standards promulgated by the Tax Commission. 
2. Because the Cache County Board of Equalization had 
considered all the evidence prior to its decision and because there 
is no issue between the parties that IHC Hospitals, Inc. had met 
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Appeal No. 92-0332 
the standards promulgated by the Commission, the Commission affirms 
the determination of the Cache County Board of Equalization. 
3. The standards promulgated by the Commission comport 
with Section 2, Article XIII, of the Utah Constitution. 
4. There being no genuine issue as to any material fact 
regarding the hospitals having met the standards promulgated by the 
Tax Commission, IHC Hospitals, Inc. is entitled judgment as a 
matter of law. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission hereby 
grants IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
affirms the determination of the County Board of Equalization of 
Cache County. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 17**" day of A i ^ / V l ^ ^ r 1992. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
R. H. Hansen 
Chairman 
/0&WtMJi\bJlk 
Jc&B. Pacheco S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of Jthua^ final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thir^^XiTOT^ys 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Cour^k^0pe^^^% 
for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-/^fVFT 63#-c4^\ 
14(2) (a). //£/ ^ V Y\ 
PH'sd/B2-0332.ord j I 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Cache Cnty Assessor / IHC Hospitals 
c/o Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy Attorney 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Kathleen Howell 
Cache County Assessor 
Cache County Courthouse 
Logan, UT 84321 
Tamara Stones 
Cache County Auditor 
County Courthouse 
Logan, UT 84321 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
DATED this // day of /UoV^/l/^ , 1992. 
Secretaryy 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER 
v. ) 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ) Appeal No. 92-0312 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, : 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Tax Type: Property 
ex rel.: IHC HOSPITALS, INC., : 
) Re: Cottonwood Hospital 
Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a hearing on IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 28, 1992. Commissioners, R. H. Hansen, Roger 0. Tew, Joe B. 
Pacheco, and S. Blaine Willes, heard the matter for and on behalf 
of the Commission. Present and representing IHC Hospitals were 
Alan L. Sullivan, Esq. and Ronald G. Moffitt, Esq. Present and 
representing the Petitioner were Bill Thomas Peters, Special Deputy 
County Attorney, and Karl Hendrickson, Deputy County Attorney. 
Based upon the arguments of counsel for the respective 
parties and the memoranda submitted in support of those arguments, 
the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The years in question are 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990 and 1991. 
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3. On July 22 and 23, 1991 the Board of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County, Utah considered the application for property tax 
exemption submitted by IHC Hospitals, Inc., for the Cottonwood 
Hospital for the tax years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991. 
4. After full consideration of the evidence presented, 
the Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County issued its Findings 
and Determination on January 6, 1992. 
5. In its findings and determination, the Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County applied the Nonprofit Hospital and 
Nursing Home Charitable Property Tax Exemption Standards 
established by the Utah State Tax Commission. The determination of 
the Board of Equalization, by a vote of 2 to 1, was that pursuant 
to the Tax Commission's standards the IHC Hospitals, Inc. and the 
Cottonwood Hospital property qualified for exemption from the 
property tax. 
6. The standards were issued by the Utah State Tax 
Commission on December 18, 1990, and a copy of those standards are 
attached to this order. (Exhibit "A"). 
7. The standards were developed by the Utah State Tax 
Commission after an extensive analysis of applicable state law, 
court decisions, and input from local government officials, 
institutional representatives and the public. 
8. The Utah State Tax Commission developed and issued 
the standards to provide an objective and relatively simple 
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framework for determining property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
hospitals and nursing homes. The primary objective in the 
development of the standards was the establishment of uniform 
statewide standards of review and analysis which are both legally 
supportable and administratively feasible. A document entitled 
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Property Tax 
Exemption Standards for Nonprofit Hospitals and Nursing Homes" 
which was issued by the Utah State Tax Commission together with the 
standards is attached to and incorporated as part of this order. 
The document outlines in detail the legal rationale and 
administrative need for the standards. (Exhibit "B"). 
9. The Petitioner filed its appeal to the Utah State Tax 
Commission from the determination of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization on February 5, 1992. 
10. On April 28, 1992# a hearing was held on IHC 
Hospitals' Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing all 
parties agreed that IHC Hospitals, Inc. and Cottonwood Hospital met 
the non-profit hospital and nursing home charitable property tax 
exemption standards promulgated by the Tax Commission. The 
Petitioner argued however, that such standards did not satisfy the 
requirements of Section 2, Article XIII, of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the present case there exists no genuine issue as 
to any material fact regarding IHC Hospitals having met the non-
-3-
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profit hospital, nursing home charitable property tax exemption 
standards promulgated by the Tax Commission. 
2. Because the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
had considered all the evidence prior to its decision and because 
there is no issue between the parties that IHC Hospitals, Inc. had 
met the standards promulgated by the Commission, the Commission 
affirms the determination of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization. 
3. The standards promulgated by the Commission comport 
with Section 2, Article XIII, of the Utah Constitution. 
4. There being no genuine issue as to any material fact 
regarding the hospitals having met the standards promulgated by the 
Tax Commission, IHC Hospitals, Inc. is entitled judgment as a 
matter of law. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission hereby 
grants IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
-4-
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affirms the determination of the County Board of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County. It is so ordered. 
DATED this / / d a y of JbwJrt//. Vl^ 1992. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
R. H.'Hansen 
Chairman 
B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
(MtmllMMu 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court, ajpetition 
for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-I$T^7,<ejlv-46b-
•Sf 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
S L County Assessor / Cottonwood Hosp. 
c/o Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy Attorney 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Robert L. Yates 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State #N2323 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
v Mike Reed 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State Street, #N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Karl Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Marc B. Johnson 
Tax Administrator 
Government Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Alan L. Sullivan, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
1/ day of PMI/L/& DATED t h i s / / day of lJdt£a3/<&t- , 1992, 
/I 
cre t 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
C O M M O N 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, ) 
ORDER 
Appeal Nos. 91-1721 
to 91-1749 
Tax Type: Property 
Re: Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center, Orem 
Community Hospital, 
American Fork Hospital, 
Springville Instacare 
Facility 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a hearing on IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 28, 1992. Commissioners, R. H. Hansen, Roger 0. Tew, Joe B. 
Pacheco, and S. Blaine Willes, heard the matter for and on behalf 
of the Commission. Present and representing IHC Hospitals were 
Alan L. Sullivan, Esq. and Ronald G. Moffitt, Esq. Present and 
representing the Petitioner was Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Based upon the arguments of counsel for the respective 
parties and the memoranda submitted in support of those arguments, 
the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The years in question are 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990 and 1991. 
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3. On September 30, 1991 the Board of Equalization of 
Utah County, Utah considered the application for property tax 
exemption submitted by IHC Hospitals, Inc., for the above 
referenced.hospitals for the tax years in question. 
4. After full consideration of the evidence presented, 
the Board of Equalization of Utah County issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision on June 30, 1992. 
5. In its findings and determination, the Board of 
Equalization of Utah County applied the Nonprofit Hospital and 
Nursing Home Charitable Property Tax Exemption Standards 
established by the Utah State Tax Commission. The determination of 
the Board of Equalization was that IHC Hospitals, Inc. and the 
above referenced hospitals met the criteria set forth in those 
standards. That finding notwithstanding, the Board, by a one to 
one vote with one member of the board recusing himself, denied the 
Petitioner's application for exemption. 
6. The standards were issued by the Utah State Tax 
Commission on December 18, 1990, and a copy of those standards are 
attached to this order. (Exhibit nA"). 
7. The standards were developed by the Utah State Tax 
Commission after an extensive analysis of applicable state law, 
court decisions, and input from local government officials, 
institutional representatives and the public. 
-2-
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8. The Utah State Tax Commission developed and issued 
the standards to provide an objective and relatively simple 
framework for determining property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
hospitals and nursing homes. The primary objective in the 
development of the standards was the establishment of uniform 
statewide standards of review and analysis which are both legally 
supportable and administratively feasible. A document entitled 
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Property Tax 
Exemption Standards for Nonprofit Hospitals and Nursing Homes" 
which was issued by the Utah State Tax Commission together with the 
standards is attached to and incorporated as part of this order. 
The document outlines in detail the legal rationale and 
administrative need for the standards. (Exhibit "B"). 
9. The Petitioner filed its appeal to the Utah State Tax 
Commission from the determination of the Utah County Board of 
Equalization on October 15, 1991. 
10. On April 28, 1992, hearing was held on IHC 
Hospitals' Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing all 
parties agreed that IHC Hospitals, Inc., and the above referenced 
hospitals met the non-profit hospital and nursing home charitable 
property tax exemption standards promulgated by the Tax Commission. 
The Respondent argued, however, that such standards did not satisfy 
the requirements of Section 2, Article XIII, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
-3-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the present case there exists no genuine issue as 
to any material fact regarding IHC Hospitals having met the non-
profit hospital, nursing home charitable property tax exemption 
standards promulgated by the Tax Commission. 
2. Because the Utah County Board of Equalization had 
considered all the evidence prior to its decision and because there 
is no issue between the parties that IHC Hospitals, Inc. had met 
the standards promulgated by the Commission, the Commission 
reverses the determination of the Utah County Board of 
Equalization. 
3. The standards promulgated by the Commission comport 
with Section 2, Article XIII, of the Utah Constitution. 
4. There being no genuine issue as to any material fact 
regarding the hospitals having met the standards promulgated by the 
Tax Commission, IHC Hospitals, Inc. is entitled judgment as a 
matter of law. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission hereby 
grants IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
-4-
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reverses the determination of the County Board of Equalization of 
Utah County. It is so ordered. 
DATED this /7 day of &j.CZi*L&Z« 1992. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Hansen 
Chairman Coirtmissioner 
y<DMUN.UUiu 
)e B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition 
for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13 (1), 63-46b-
14(2) (a) . 
Pfl/td.Vt-!72t.ord 
\- * \ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
c/o Alan L. Sullivan 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Ronald M. Smith 
Utah County Assessor 
Utah County Building 
Provo, UT 84601 
Bruce J. Peacock 
Utah County Auditor 
Utah County Building 
Provo, UT 84601 
-Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy Attorney 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this /? day of JQ/,r(\f/?/C''.7^ 1992. 
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NONPROFIT HOSPITAL AND NURSING 
HOME CHARITABLE PROPERTY TAX 
EXEMPTION STANDARDS 
Utah State Tax Commission 
December 18, 1990 
PVUIDiT A 
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STANDARD I : The institution owning the property for which the 
exemption i s sought must establ ish that i t i s organised on a 
nonprofit basis to (a) provide hospital or nursing home care; 
(b) promote health care , or (c) provide health r e l a t e d 
ass istance to the general public. The ins t i tut ion's property 
must be dedicated to i t s c h a r i t a b l e purpose , and upon 
d i s s o l u t i o n i t s assets must be distributable only for exempt 
purposes under Utah law, or to the government for a public 
purpose. 
COMMENTS: An i n s t i t u t i o n needs to show t h a t i t i s proper ly 
o rgan ized and o p e r a t i n g in good s t a n d i n g under 
a p p r o p r i a t e U t a h law g o v e r n i n g n o n p r o f i t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I n s t r u m e n t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n and 
o p e r a t i o n should r e f l e c t the h e a l t h c a r e - r e l a t e d 
purpose for which the i n s t i t u t i o n i s organized and 
c o n t a i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l i m i t a t i o n s on a s s e t 
d i s t r ibu t ion . 
STANDARD I I : The i n s t i t u t i on owning the property for which the 
exemption i s sought must es tab l i sh that none of i t s net earnings 
and no donations made to i t inures to the benefit of private 
sha reho lde r s or o ther indiv iduals , as the private inurement 
standard has been interpreted under Section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
COMMENTS: Compliance with and operation under the provisions of 
Section 501(c)(3) c r e a t e s a r ebu t t ab l e presumption 
tha t an i n s t i t u t i o n ' s operations are reasonable. An 
in s t i t u t ion i s required to provide the following: (a) 
a f f i d a v i t s and f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t s showing a l l 
revenue and expenditures and describing the uses to 
which revenue has been put, and the amount, nature and 
uses of donated funds; (b) proof of federal t ax 
exempt s ta tus under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue-Coder •--(c) af fidavits* or~other -evidence "that 
payments made to of f icers , employees, contractors and 
supp l i e r s are reasonable and not a covert means of 
making payments to pr iva te persons. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD III : The institution owning the property for which the 
exemption i s sought must establ ish: (a) that i t admits and 
treats members of the public without regard to race, religion or 
gender; (b) that hospital or nursing home service, including 
admission to the inst itution, i s based on the cl inical judgment 
of the physician and not upon the patient's financial ability or 
inability to pay for services; and (c) that indigent persons 
who, in the judgment of the admitting physician, require the 
services generally available at the hospital or nursing home, 
receive those services for no charge or for a reduced charge, in 
accordance with their abil i ty to pay. The institution must also 
provide evidence of i t s efforts to aff irmatively inform the 
publ ic of i t s open access po l icy and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
services for the indigent. 
COMMENTS: The open access requirements outlined in t h i s standard 
must be es tab l i shed as a formalized po l icy of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n . More impor t an t ly , however, are the 
ef for ts of the ins t i tu t ion t o inform the public of the 
open-access pol icy. This s i t u a t i o n i s pa r t i cu la r ly 
important with regard to se rv ices for the indigent . 
The exempt i n s t i t u t i o n must provide evidence of i t s 
e f f o r t s to aff i rmat ively inform the pub l ic of the 
ava i l ab i l i t y of these services . 
STANDARD IV: The institution owning the property for which the 
exemption i s sought must establish that i t s pol ic ies integrate 
and ref lect the public interest . A rebuttable presumption of 
compliance with th is standard i s assumed i f i t i s shown that (a) the i n s t i t u t i o n ' s governing board has a broad-based 
membership from the community served by the ins t i tu t ion , as 
required by federal tax law; (b) the inst i tut ion confers at 
least annually with the county board of equalization or i t s 
designee concerning the community's c l in ica l hospital needs that 
might be appropriately addressed by the inst i tut ion; and (c) 
the ins t i tut ion establishes and maintains a "charity plan11 to 
ensure compliance with Standard III and Standard IV. However, 
a l l pol icy-decis ions Telating to the ihstitutibfr* s^governance 
and operat ion s h a l l remain under the d i r e c t i o n of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n ' s governing body. (Note : Compliance with 
subsections (b) and (c) are prospective only beginning with tax 
year 1991.) 
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COMMENTS: J u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on property tax exemptions 
highlight the importance of charitable i n s t i t u t i o n s 
contributing to the common good. In addition, the 
courts have indicated that charitability must require 
an element of "gift" and have stated that such a g i f t 
may be met through the lessening of a governmental 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In meeting t h i s s tandard the 
membership and operat ion of governing boards i s 
important. Governing boards should have a broad-based 
membership and f u n c t i o n in a g e n e r a l l y open 
atmosphere. Where governing boards of individual 
institutions are part of a larger corporate structure, 
there must also be evidence that the corporate board 
incorporates the in teres t s of individual governing 
boards into i t s p o l i c i e s . There should a l so be a 
showing that exempt institutions seek to address the 
health care needs of the community. The standard 
imposes a requirement that the ins t i tut ion confer at 
least annually with county o f f i c i a l s to assess the 
clinical hospital needs of the community which might 
be addressed by the ins t i tu t ion . In addition, the 
institution must develop a "charity plan" to ensure 
compliance w i t h Standard I I I ( the o p e n - a c c e s s 
requirement) and Standard IV (the publ ic i n t e r e s t 
requirement). Two important po int s of caut ion: 
First, the term "community" may well be narrower or 
broader than an i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t y ' s geographic 
boundaries. Efforts to meet charitable standards are 
not disqualified simply because they involve rendering 
services outside a specific county's boundaries or to 
non-residents of a s p e c i f i c county. Second, a l l 
policy d e c i s i o n s r e l a t i n g to the governance and 
operation of the institution are ultimately under the 
direction of the inst i tut ion's governing board. For 
example, a county may not require as a condition of 
exemption that a nonprofit hospital fund s p e c i f i c 
programs. 
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STANDARD V: The i n s t i t u t i o n owning t h e property for which 
exemption i s sought must e s t a b l i s h t h a t i t s t o t a l g i f t to the 
community exceeds on an annual bas i s i t s property tax l i a b i l i t y 
for that year. The Utah Supreme Court has defined g i f t to the 
community as f o l l o w s : "A g i f t t o t h e community can be 
i d e n t i f i e d e i t h e r by a subs tant ia l imbalance in the exchange 
between the charity and the rec ip ient of i t s serv ices or in the 
l e s s e n i n g of a government burden t h r o u g h t h e c h a r i t y ' s 
operation." Dtah County v . Intermountain Health Care, I n c . , 709 
P.2d 265, 269 (Utah 1985) 
The fol lowing quant i f iab le a c t i v i t i e s and services are to 
be counted towards the nonprof i t e n t i t y ' s t o t a l g i f t to the 
community: 
a. Indigent care — The reasonable value of the h o s p i t a l ' s 
unreimbursed care to medica l ly i n d i g e n t p a t i e n t s . The term 
"medica l ly ind igent" r e f e r s g e n e r a l l y t o p a t i e n t s who are 
f inancial ly unable to pay for the cos t of the care they rece ive . 
Measurement: The value of the i n s t i t u t i o n ' s unreimbursed care 
to p a t i e n t s , as measured by standard charges , reduced by the 
average of reduct ions afforded to a l l p a t i e n t s who are not 
covered by government e n t i t l e m e n t programs, p l u s e x p e n s e s 
d irect ly associated with spec ia l indigent c l i n i c s . 
b. Community education and serv ice — the reasonable value 
of volunteer and community s e r v i c e ( i n c l u d i n g education and 
research) rendered for and by the h o s p i t a l or nursing home. 
Measurement: unreimbursed expense. "Unreimbursed expense" i s 
defined as the i d e n t i f i a b l e cos t s and expenses incurred by an 
i n s t i t u t i o n in performing a s p e c i f i c s e r v i c e , inc lud ing any 
overhead attributable to the serv ice , l e s s any reimbursement for 
the service from r e c i p i e n t s , government or any other source . 
Overhead does not include any c a p i t a l c o s t s for bui ld ings or 
equipment unless purchased or b u i l t s o l e l y for the a c t i v i t y in 
q u e s t i o n . Community e d u c a t i o n d o e s no t i n c l u d e i n - h o u s e 
training for employees. 
c . M e d i c a l d i s c o u n t s - - The r e a s o n a b l e v a l u e o f 
unreimbursed care for pat i ents covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or 
other s imi lar government en t i t l ement programs. Measurement: 
the difference between ( i ) standard charges, as reduced by the 
average of reduct ions afforded to a l l p a t i e n t s who are not 
covered by government ent i t lement programs, and ( i i ) actual 
reimbursement. 
d. Donations of time — The reasonable value of volunteer 
a s s i s t a n c e donated by ind iv idua l s t o a nonprofit hosp i ta l or 
nursing home. Measurement: volunteer hours times a reasonable 
rate for services performed. 
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e. Donations of money ~ The value of monetary donations i 
given to a nonprofit hospital or nursing home. Measurement; 
Where donations are spent on depreciable items, the value of the 
g i f t should be amortized over the useful l i f e of f a c i l i t i e s 
purchased; where donations are spent on p a t i e n t care and 
non-depreciable items, the fu l l amount of the donations should 
be counted in the year of donation; and where donations are < 
retained and invested, annual cap i ta l appreciation from the 
donation should be counted towards the g i f t . 
The ins t i tu t ion ' s charitable g i f t to the community also 
i n c l u d e s the community v a l u e , whether or not p r e c i s e l y 
quantifiable, of (a) the operation of tert iary care units or < 
other c r i t i c a l services or programs that may not otherwise be 
offered to the community, or (b) the continued operation of 
hospitals where revenues are insuff icient to cover cos ts , such 
as a primary care hospital in a rural community. 
COMMENTS; Standard V ou t l ines general ca tegor ies of qual ifying 
a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s not meant as an exhaustive l i s t i n g . 
Ins t i tu t ions seeking exemption are required t o show: (a) accounting data es tab l i sh ing the amount and value 
of unreimbursed care to medically indigent persons , 
and s u b s i d i z e d p a t i e n t s ; (b) a c c o u n t i n g d a t a 
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e unreimbursed va lue of community 
education and serv ice programs, including research and { 
professional education programs; (c) accounting data 
establ ishing the amount and uses of volunteer time and 
donated funds; and (d) descr ip t ions of in tangible or 
unquantif iable community g i f t s . Standard V does not 
specify how those a c t i v i t i e s c lass i f i ed as intangible 
or unquantifiable are t o be measured. That issue wil l ' 
be examined on a case by case bas i s . 
STANDARD VI: S a t e l l i t e health-care f a c i l i t i e s and centralized 
support f a c i l i t i e s are ent i t l ed to property tax exemption i f i t 
i s shown that such f a c i l i t i e s enhance-and improve -the governing 
hospital 's mission. These f a c i l i t i e s should be tested as part 
of the hospi ta l or nursing home that operates the support 
f a c i l i t y . 
COMMENT; Property tax exemption s tandards should not mandate 
operational i n e f f i c i e n c i e s . Where i t i s shown tha t a 
nonprof i t f a c i l i t y b e t t e r meets i t s s t a t e d mission 
through the exis tence of these f a c i l i t i e s they may be 
included in the governing hospi ta l or nursing home's 
exemption. The exemption does not apply to o f f - s i t e 
f a c i l i t i e s which a r e no t d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the 
s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n , such a s 
individual physic ians ' o f f i ces . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM VI 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Utah State Tax Commission 
December 18, 1990 
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MEMORANDUM OP POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION STANDARDS 
FOR NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND NURSING HOMES 
The Utah Tax Commission has issued "Nonprofit Hospital and 
Nursing Home Charitable Property Tax Standards" to county boards 
of equalization across the s t a t e . The purposes of the standards 
are : 
(1) t o s u g g e s t an o b j e c t i v e and r e l a t i v e l y s imp le 
framework for de t e rmin ing p roper ty t ax exemption 
applicat ions for hosp i t a l s and nursing homes, and 
(2) t o p r o v i d e c o u n t i e s , p r o p e r t y owners and o t h e r 
interested p a r t i e s with not ice of the standards t h a t 
the Tax Commission in tends t o observe in deciding 
appeals from county boards of equalization concerning 
the exempt or nonexempt s t a tus of nonprofit hosp i ta l s 
and nursing homes. 
The purpose of t h i s memorandum i s to explain the l e g a l 
basis of the standards issued by the Tax Commission. 
The Need for Standards 
The s t a n d a r d s have been d r a f t e d t o comply wi th t h e 
requirements of Utah law under Ar t ic le 13, Section 2 of the Utah 
Cons t i tu t ion and Sec t ion 59-2-1101(1)(d) of the Utah Code. 
These provisions have most recent ly been interpreted in re la t ion 
to hosp i t a l s and s i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s in Yorgason v . County 
Board , 714 P .2d 653 ( U t a h 1986) , and Utah County v . 
Intermountain Health Care, I n c . , 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). 
These cases have presented a d i f f i c u l t problem for both county 
boards of equal izat ion and the Tax Commission. Although they 
provide- g e n e r a l - g u i d a n c e and s igna l the need for increased 
scrut iny , they do not provide counties or the Tax Commission 
with objective standards by which to measure the sufficiency of 
par t icu lar exemption a p p l i c a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , for 1986 and 
subsequent years d i f fe ren t counties proceeded to decide hospi ta l 
and nursing home appl ica t ions on the basis of widely divergent 
s tandards. Some count ies f e l t the need to conduct exhaustive 
and time consuming hearings and to invest igate the financial and 
chari table a c t i v i t i e s of hosp i t a l s and nursing homes in d e t a i l . 
Other count ies conducted only cursory i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e 
re levan t i s s u e s . Some count ies emphasized the importance of 
indigent care , while o ther count ies emphasized the r e l i e f of 
government burdens. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under these circumstances, the hospitals and nursing homes 
had only a vague idea of the standards that would be used to 
decide their exemptions on an annual basis. They did not have a 
clear idea of the nature of the information they should submit 
to the counties. The Tax Commission therefore decided to study 
the Supreme Court's decisions, confer with county and 
institutional representatives, and derive a set of objective 
standards that could be used efficiently by the Tax Commission 
to decide the exemption appeals that would come before it. 
The Tax Commission's Authority 
Under Article 13, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution and 
Section 59-1-210 of the Utah Code, the Tax Commission has the 
responsibility to adopt policies and guidelines to govern county 
boards of equalization and county assessors in the performance 
of their duties relating to equalization. Under the same 
constitutional and statutory provisions, the Tax Commission has 
the duty to supervise the tax laws, to exercise general 
supervision over county boards and to direct assessors and 
county boards in matters relating to the equalization of 
property. The Tax Commission has had these powers and duties 
since statehood, and they have frequently been confirmed in the 
courts. See, e.g., Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 
487 P.2d 1272, 1276 (Utah 1971); University Heights, Inc. v. 
State Tax Commission, 364 P. 2d 661, 662 (Utah 1961) ; County 
Board of Equalization v. State Tax Commission. 50 P.2d 418, 421 
(Utah 1935). 
The Tax Commission felt keenly the responsibility to 
provide county officials and property owners with a definitive 
set of guidelines in this area. The standards issued by the Tax 
Commission fulfill its responsibilities to counties, property 
owners and the public. 
- General Assumptions •••••-• 
Under Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, the 
property of nonprofit institutions should be exempt from 
property tax if it is "used exclusively" for "charitable" 
purposes. In Utah, "charity" means "the contribution or 
dedication of something of value to the common good." Utah 
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.r 709 P.2d 265, 269 
(Utah 1985) . As the Utah Supreme Court said in Yorgason v. 
County Board, 714 P.2d 653, 657 (Utah 1986), "The test of 
charitable purpose is public benefit or contribution to the 
common good. It is also necessary that there be an element of 
gift to the community." 
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Perhaps the most s i gn i f i cant threshold quest ion faced by 
the Tax Commission was whether the r e c e i p t of payment from 
p a t i e n t s , in surers or government e n t i t l e m e n t programs would 
permit an i n s t i t u t i o n t o r e t a i n i t s c h a r i t a b l e exemption. 
Nearly a l l of the public nonprofit hosp i ta l s and nursing homes 
in Utah cover most of t h e i r expenses with the revenue from such 
payments. 
The Tax Commission concluded that nonprofit hospitals and 
nurs ing homes should not be d i s q u a l i f i e d from r e c e i v i n g a 
property tax exemption simply because much of the cost of their 
providing medical s erv ice i s recovered through fees charged to 
persons able to pay. In Utah "exclusively charitable11 purposes 
have never been confined to the unreimbursed care of indigent 
p a t i e n t s . To the contrary, in Yorcrason the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
"This court has adopted the general rule that the 
language of the c lause exempting property 'used 
e x c l u s i v e l y . . . for chari table purposes1 from 
taxation should be s t r i c t l y construed. This does 
not mean, however, tha t purposes e x c l u s i v e l y 
charitable are l imited to the mere r e l i e f of the 
d e s t i t u t e or the giving of alms. In fac t , what 
q u a l i f i e s as a purpose exc lus ive ly charitable i s 
1
 subjec t to judgment in the l i g h t of changing 
community mores. f" 
714 P.2d at 656 (emphasis added; c i t a t i o n s omitted) , quoting Salt 
Lake County v . Tax Commission ex r e l . Greater S a l t Lake 
Recreat ional F a c i l i t i e s , 596 P.2d 641, 643 (Utah 1979). Our 
research d i s c l o s e s no U.S. j u r i s d i c t i o n that denies nonprofit 
hosp i ta l s or nursing homes a property tax exemption on the ground 
t h a t t h e y r e c e i v e payment from p a t i e n t s who can pay, from 
insurance, or from government entitlement programs. 
Another important t h r e s h o l d q u e s t i o n we faced was the 
fol lowing: should*-an- - i n s t i t u t i o n s property "tax- exemption hinge 
on i t s providing free care to indigents in amounts equal to a 
certa in percentage of i t s gross revenue or net revenue? The Tax 
Commission answered t h i s q u e s t i o n i n t h e n e g a t i v e for two 
reasons. F i r s t , we could find no Utah authority for imposing an 
absolute requirement that an i n s t i t u t i o n ' s indigent care had to 
equal a cer ta in percentage of revenue. Were the Tax Commission 
t o come up with a percentage , i t would be t o t a l l y arbi trary . 
Second, imposing such a r u l e on i n s t i t u t i o n s would f o s t e r 
uncertainty and confusion. The amount of subsidized care needed 
by the community f l u c t u a t e s from year t o year with trends in 
employment and the economy. An i n s t i t u t i o n ' s exemption would 
depend more on economic condit ions outside i t s control than on 
3 
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its service to community needs. In Medical Center Hospital v. 
City of Burlington, A.2d (Vt. 1989) , the Vermont 
Supreme Court rejected this percentage approach for reasons we 
believe to be sound: 
"In our opinion, pegging charitability to a 
stated amount of free care would not be workable 
in determining an organization's taxable status. 
Instead, uncertainty would reign, with taxability 
determined on a yearly basis depending on 
economic factors not within the control of any 
one person or organization." 
A.2d at . 
A third important threshold question we faced was whether 
i n s t i t u t i o n s should receive exemptions only in proportion to the 
free indigent care they provide. This approach would allow a 
t o t a l exemption only for f a c i l i t i e s or por t ions of f a c i l i t i e s 
that are t o t a l l y dedicated to the provision of free care; other 
f a c i l i t i e s would o n l y r e c e i v e p a r t i a l e x e m p t i o n s in the 
proportion to which they are dedicated to non-paying pat ients . 
We rejected t h i s approach for both legal and p r a c t i c a l reasons. 
In the f i r s t p l a c e , we could f ind no a u t h o r i t y i n Utah or 
elsewhere for apportionment of exemptions on t h i s b a s i s . In the 
second p lace , t h i s approach would tend to return hospi ta l s and 
nurs ing homes t o t h e e a r l y 19th Century, e n c o u r a g i n g the 
establishment of poor wards and other segregated modes of care 
for rich and poor. In addit ion, t h i s approach i s based on an 
unreasonably narrow concept of charity: i t would discourage the 
e f forts of f u l l - s e r v i c e hospita ls to provide such other community 
b e n e f i t s as community education, community h e a l t h screening , 
health science research, and physician and nursing education. 
Final ly , we considered careful ly whether an i n s t i t u t i o n ' s 
a c t i v i t i e s s h o u l d be d i s q u a l i f i e d from b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d 
"charitable" simply because some for-prof i t businesses engage in 
the same a c t i v i t i e s . We could f ind no ' l e g a l support for the 
proposition that charity must be confined only t o endeavors that 
a r e n e v e r d u p l i c a t e d by f o r - p r o f i t b u s i n e s s e s . Such a 
re s t r i c t ion would discourage, rather than encourage, many types 
of undeniably charitable work. 
Authority for Standard I 
Under t h i s standard, the i n s t i t u t i o n owning the property 
for which the exemption i s sought must e s t a b l i s h that i t i s 
organized on a nonprofit bas is for appropriate purposes, and i t s 
property must be dedicated to i t s charitable purpose. This 
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standard derives directly from Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution, which requires the owner of exempt property to be a 
"nonprofit entity." In Utah County, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a hospital seeking an exemption must show that its "stated 
purpose" is to provide a significant service to others "without 
immediate expectation of material reward." 709 P.2d at 269. In 
applying this standard, the Court examined the institution's 
corporate purposes and the restrictions on the distribution of 
assets to private interests, as set forth in its articles of 
incorporation. Id. at 272-73. The present Standard I is issued 
to require exactly the type of inquiry suggested by the Supreme 
Court in Utah County. 
Authority for Standard II 
Under this standard, the institution must show that none of 
its net earnings and none of the donations made to it inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, as 
interpreted under federal tax law. The source of this standard 
is again the Utah County case, which held that counties must 
consider: 
(1) "whether private interests are benefited by the 
organization or operation" of hospitals that apply for 
the exemption, 7 09 P.2d at 276, and 
(2) "whether income received from all sources . . . 
produces a 'profit1 to the entity. . . . " Id. At 269. 
For the limited purpose of determining what is or is not 
"private inurement" in specific fact situations, the Tax 
Commission incorporated the federal rules relating to private 
inurement under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
These rules constitute a ready-made and well-established body of 
law. These federal rules are well-known to hospitals, nursing 
homes and other public charities. Section 501(c)(3) allows the 
charitable exemption only if "no part of the riet earnings . . . 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . 
. . . " This provision has been construed authoritatively by the 
Treasury Department in Section 1.501(c)(3)-1 of the Internal 
Revenue Regulations and in many revenue rulings and court 
decisions that directly concern hospitals. See, e.g., Revenue 
Ruling 69-545, 1962-2 C.B. 117. The Tax Commission could see no 
practical reason to invent a new body of law in this limited area 
when the federal standard has been so widely and exhaustively 
applied. 
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Authority for Standard III 
This standard requires that the entity applying for the 
exemption establish three things: 
First, the hospital or nursing home must show that it 
admits members of the public without regard to race, 
religion or gender. 
Second, the institution must show that the decision to 
treat or admit a patient or nursing home resident is based 
upon the clinical judgment of the admitting physician and 
not upon the patient's financial status. 
Third, the institution must prove that, as a result of the 
foregoing, medically indigent persons who need those 
services generally available at a hospital or nursing home 
receive them for a reduced charge or for no charge in 
accordance with their ability to pay. 
This standard derives from three of the Utah Supreme 
Court's guidelines concerning: 
(1) "whether the recipients of the 'charity' are required 
to pay for the assistance received, in whole or part," 
(2) "whether the beneficiaries of the 'charity' are 
restricted and, if restricted, whether the restriction 
bears a reasonable relationship to the entity's 
charitable objective," and 
(3) "whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide 
a significant service to others without immediate 
expectation of material reward." Utah County, supra, 
709 P.2d at 269. 
Consistent with Utah County, institutions who wish to 
comply with this standard must prove that they -have a formalized 
policy of open access. The institution must also demonstrate 
that it has made a genuine effort to inform the public of the 
open access policy. 
Authority for Standard IV 
This standard requires institutions to show that their 
policies integrate and reflect the public interest. They must do 
so by demonstrating that their governing boards have broad-based 
membership and function in a generally open atmosphere, and that 
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they seek to address the health care needs of the community. The 
means of complying with this standard are specifically outlined. 
However, all policy decisions relating to an institution's 
governance and operation remain in the hands of the institution's 
governing body. This standard derives from the principle that 
the "act of giving," which is essential to charity, can be 
identified "in the lessening of a government burden through the 
charity's operation." Utah County. 709 P.2d at 269; Salt Lake 
County v. Tax Comm'n. ex rel. Laborers Local No. 295. 658 P. 2d 
1192, 1198 (Utah 1983) (Oaks, J., concurring). 
Authority for Standard V 
This standard requires that the institution must establish 
annually that its "total gift to the community" exceeds its 
potential property tax liability for the year. The standard sets 
forth a partial list of the activities and services that may 
count towards an institution's "total gift." 
Like Standard IV, Standard V is based on the need to prove 
a "gift," by showing "a substantial imbalance in the exchange 
between the charity and the recipient of its services," or by 
showing "the lessening of a government burden." Utah County, 709 
P.2d at 269. In Yorcrason v. County Board. 714 P.2d at 660 & 
n.29, the Utah Supreme Court utilized a gift-to-tax comparison 
like the one in Standard V. 
The components of the "gift" listed in the standard reflect 
specific ways in which institutions have traditionally 
demonstrated their charity. The list is also intended to reflect 
factors deemed important by the Utah Supreme Court. For example, 
the unreimbursed value of care to indigent, elderly and other 
patients is "[o]ne of the most significant factors to be 
considered in review of a claimed exemption." Utah County. 709 
P. 2d at 274. The institution's reliance on donations of time and 
money, and the quantifiable impact of those donations on 
patients, are also important factors, according to the Court. 
Id. at 273. In addition, Standard V recognizes the contribution 
to the common good discharged in the marshalling of community 
resources to assist in charitable activities. While the focus of 
Standard V is on defining and quantifying the value of certain 
activities, it is important to remember that the process of 
determining the total gift to the community is more than a mere 
accounting exercise. 
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Authority of Standard VI 
Standard VI provides that satellite health care facilities 
and centralized support facilities are entitled to the exemption 
if they enhance and improve an exempt institution's charitable 
mission. This standard merely recognizes the need for 
operational flexibility. For example, a hospital or nursing home 
may serve the community through the establishment of neighborhood 
clinics. Hospitals may conclude that they operate more 
efficiently by sharing a free-standing support facility — such 
as a laundry — with affiliated nonprofit institutions. Although 
the Utah Supreme Court has never ruled on the exempt status of 
such off-site facilities, other courts have upheld their exempt 
status where they enable or enhance the exempt institution's 
charitable activities. See, e.g., Shared Hospital Services Corp. 
v. Ferguson, 673 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. 1984) (exempt status of shared 
laundry service); Barnes Hospital v. Leggett, 646 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 
App. 1983) (exempt status of separate office building used for 
hospital clinics and medical student training). 
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